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Preface 
This report analyses recent developments within the electricity market and the natural gas 
market within Europe. Both markets are currently moving towards more competition, following 
the launch of the EU Directives on Electricity and Gas in the late 1990s. The aim of this policy 
is to increase efficiency within the energy sector and consequently consumer welfare by 
creating Community wide markets for electricity and natural gas. At the same time, 
governments want to maintain the security of supply of energy and to increase the sustainability 
of the use of energy. 
 
What are the results of the liberalisation process up to now? Are the policy goals within reach? 
Which factors hamper the creation of one competitive European energy market? Which 
challenges do governments face? 
 
These are the main questions answered by this report. Its focus is on the electricity market, 
albeit the natural gas market receives some attention. Moreover, the report looks into the 
situation of opening the energy markets in the accession countries. 
 
Stefan Speck, working as a free lance economic researcher and living in Austria, wrote this 
report on request of the CPB. Machiel Mulder, CPB’s head of the Energy unit, initiated and 
guided the project. 
 
They thank several CPB colleagues, Olinka Gjigas, and David Kernohan for their detailed 
comments and for their constructive input throughout the process of writing this report. In 
addition, we thank the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs for the financial contribution to this 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Policy ambitions 
One of the objectives of the European Union is the creation of Community-wide markets for 
products and services. Such common markets already exist for some energy products, such as 
oil products, but not for other energy products, such as electricity and gas. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the prevailing energy systems for electricity and gas have been of some concern 
to the political decision-makers in the EU in the past.  
The lack of competition and differences in the prevailing systems led to wide divergences in 
energy prices among the EU member states. National policy goals diverged with the 
consequences of differences in the mix of fuels and plant type used in electricity production and 
large variations in the use of gas in EU member states. Furthermore, the networks transporting 
electricity and gas can be characterised as natural monopolies because it will never be economic 
to build competing networks to serve the same customers. 
 
The implementation of the objective of establishing a single internal market for electricity and 
gas led to a number of significant changes in the energy policies and systems within EU 
member states. The major driving forces for the liberalisation of these energy markets have 
been the Directive on Electricity and the Directive on Gas. The intention of these directives is 
the creation of a single European market for electricity and for gas consequently guaranteeing 
competitive European energy markets and simultaneously contributing to achieving the general 
energy policy objectives. The formation of these markets shall generate economic benefits in 
terms of improving the efficiency of electricity and gas production. Competition between 
producers and suppliers should lead to innovation and to the delivery of energy to final 
consumers in the most efficient way thereby improving the welfare of European citizens.  
 
Furthermore, there have been widespread concerns at national and European level that energy 
prices were unnecessarily high compared to the major trading partners in the world, thus 
damaging national competitiveness and leading to a loss of consumer welfare. To address these 
anti-competitive trends in the market, the European Commission launched the Electricity and 
Gas Directives, which had to be transposed into national legislation by EU member states.  
 
Both directives established a timetable for achieving minimum levels of market opening and 
established approaches for the introduction of competition in the energy market. After the first 
evaluation of the implementation of the Electricity and Gas Directives a revised version of the 
directives, the new Acceleration Directive dealing with some of the imperfections of the initial 
directives were proposed by the European Commission in March 2001. The European Council 
held in Barcelona in March 2002 welcomed the progress made in implementing these  
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directives. However, the European Council requested annual updates of the process of opening 
up the markets for electricity and gas. The European Commission published the second 
benchmarking report in October 2002.  
 
The European Energy Council agreed at its meeting in November 2002 to several issues such as 
a timetable for market opening, provisions regarding the unbundling of transmission and 
distribution system operators (TSOs/DSOs). Based on these compromises the deadlines for the 
complete liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets will be July 2004 for non-household 
users and July 2007 for household users. 
1.2  Research questions 
The creation of a competitive energy market is not a straightforward task as the recent 
development clearly shows and as various scholars as well as the European Commission state in 
different reports. Several potential problems are addressed in the directives themselves. The 
actual difficulties of creating such competitive markets became really visible during the process 
of transposing these directives into domestic national law, and implementation of the legal and 
economical requirements of these directives.  
·  Conditions for the creation of an internal and competitive electricity market 
One of the main questions raised during this process is directed to the analysis of the conditions 
necessary for establishing an internal electricity market with full competition. There are severe 
doubts that the current situation and prevailing conditions do not fulfil the basic idea and 
requirements of having a common and competitive electricity market in the EU. Therefore, the 
report analyses some of the main features of a competitive market by focusing, in particular, on 
the price formation and a comparison with the current status of electricity markets in EU 
member states. 
·  Factors hampering the creation of a competitive market 
This analysis leads to the identification of factors hampering the creation of a competitive 
energy market. These obstacles can be of economical, institutional or technical nature and have 
in common hindering the development of a common European electricity market. This study 
examines in more detail the issues surrounding access to networks; the problems arising as a 
result of market concentration at the supply side; and questions related to common 
environmental policy objectives. The question is how can the obstacles concerning the creation 
of a competitive European electricity market be removed and whether the problem surrounding 
these barriers can, at all, be eliminated.  
·  Transfer of findings (electricity vs. gas market)  
The report attempts to examine whether the findings regarding electricity are valid for the 
development of the gas market; in other words, are the same obstacles interfering with the 
creation of a competitive European gas market. Due to a number of special characteristics of  
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gas, such as long-term contracting and the gas price formation, it is evidently unrealistic to 
directly transfer all the findings from the electricity to the gas market. The gas price formation 
is of central importance because the current circumstances of establishing the gas price via the 
so-called oil-price linkage used in the majority of EU member states is not in accordance with 
the conditions of a competitive market. 
·  Transposition of the EU Directive on Electricity in the accession countries 
The last question raised by this report concerns the current status of the electricity markets in 
the accession countries. Keeping in mind that these countries have to implement all EU 
directives before joining the EU, an analysis of the condition of these markets has some 
relevance. An important question that needs addressing is whether the barriers hampering the 
development of a competitive electricity market identified in EU member states are also 
relevant for the accession countries. 
 
1.3  Method 
The approach used in this study is: 
1.  to make an inventory of the current situation regarding policies aiming to create a common and 
competitive energy market for electricity at the European level; 
2.  to discuss an ideal situation of having a competitive electricity market;  
3.  to analyse how well are some of the requirements laid down in the relevant EU Directives 
implemented at the level of EU member states; and  
4.  to study potential barriers for achieving this policy objective.  
 
However, such an analysis has to be restricted in a way owing to the great number of potential 
implications resulting from the implementation of the relevant policies on the EU as well as on 
the national levels. Therefore, the focus is on analysing the effects of general policy measures 
and the implications of obstacles identified during this process with regard to the price 
formation by comparing the current and anticipated future situation with a hypothetical situation 
of a fully competitive electricity market.  
 
Furthermore, an analysis of regional and national electricity markets is carried out considering 
the features identified as barriers for the creation of a competitive electricity market. 
Worthwhile studying is the development of a competitive European gas market and the 
situation regarding the electricity markets in the accession countries using these findings as a 
sort of benchmark.  
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1.4  Outline of the report 
This report is divided into three parts. 
Part I consists of two chapters discussing the current status and progress made in implementing 
the directives. In addition, it analyses the conditions for having competitive electricity market 
and identifies factors impeding the development of competition. Part II exemplifies these 
findings by reviewing the evolution of a number of national electricity markets in Europe. The 
last part of this report explores whether the identified factors have the potential of hampering 
the creation of competitive gas market in Europe and provides a short overview of the current 
status of the electricity markets in accession countries. 
 
Part I starts with an overview of the political background debating the underlying rationale and 
first results of the implementation process of the EU Directives on Electricity and Gas (Section 
2.1), while a more theoretical discussion of the conditions for a competitive electricity market 
follows (Section 2.2). The most recent development of electricity prices in EU member states is 
discussed in Section 2.3.  
 
Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. Each section identifies features regularly perceived as 
severe obstacles in the process of creating a competitive European electricity market. Section 
3.1 reveals the importance of network capacity constraints and issues surrounding the access to 
the networks followed by an investigation of the process of increased market concentration in 
the electricity supply chain (Section 3.2). The last chapter in this section (Section 3.3) addresses 
the latent controversy between the objectives of the EU Directive on Electricity and the more 
general environmental policy objectives. The former are seen as drivers to increase efficiency 
by bringing in competitive forces aiming to converge the electricity prices at a lower level. The 
objectives behind environmental policy considerations can lead to an increase in electricity 
prices resulting from the internalisation of external costs through market-based instruments and 
promotion of renewable energy sources via special support schemes.  
 
Chapter 4 offers a cross-country analysis of energy markets. It analyse the market in the 
Nordic/Scandinavian countries, the UK market, the German market, the two southern European 
markets in Spain and Italy, and finally the Dutch market. 
 
Part III of the report examines whether the patterns identified in the above mentioned chapter 
are also relevant for the evolution of the European gas market (Chapter 5) and the electricity 
markets in the accession countries (Chapter 6). The main findings are summarised in the 
Chapter 7. That chapter ends by analysing challenges for governments.  
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2  Recent Developments and Future Challenges  
2.1  The political background 
Energy markets in Europe have been widely dominated by national and regional monopolies in 
EU member states as well as in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe aiming to join the 
EU. These, very often national monopolies, could be described as vertically integrated 
electricity companies generating, transporting as well as selling electricity to the final customer. 
A similar structure of national or regional monopolies could be found in the gas market in EU 
member states. Furthermore, these monopolies were often in public ownership, with all the 
advantages and disadvantages of this form of ownership, and have regularly dominated the 15 
national, largely isolated markets. One of the main policy objectives of the European Union is 
the creation of a European common market, including the completion of an internal energy 
market by speeding up the liberalisation of the electricity and gas market.  
 
The process of establishing internal electricity and gas markets started with the adoption of the 
European Parliament and Council Directives for electricity (96/92/EC – Electricity Directive) 
and for gas (98/30/EC – Gas Directive) and their implementation by the EU member states in 
1999 and 2000. Both directives have since been transposed into national legislation. Some of 
the main features of the directives regarding the liberalisation process of these markets can be 
summarised as follows
1: 
·  Gradually opening the energy markets for electricity and gas
2; 
·  Establishing of rules concerning access to the transmission and distribution network – regulated 
third party access (rTPA); negotiated third party access (nTPA); or the ‘single buyer’ model;  
·  Establishing requirements for national dispute settlement authority but not as an independent 
regulatory body;  
·  Providing two options for the construction of new generating infrastructure: a tendering 
procedure and an authorisation procedure; 
·  Ensuring management unbundling of the transmission system operator (TSO); and 
·  Ensuring accounting separation of transmission and distribution activities from other parts of 
the companies.  
 
The underlying rationale and objectives for implementing the Electricity Directive have been 




 See for a full description of the process and policies with respect to the opening the electricity market: European 
Commission (1998) and European Commission (2000). 
2
 The liberalisation process focuses mainly on the development of the demand side; i.e. liberalisation is measured in terms 
of market opening by defining the percentage of total consumption accounted for by the end-consumer free to choose the 
supplier. The development of the supply side has been partly ignored under the assumption that the development of a large 
single European energy market as the final result of the transition process from 15 national markets would be sufficient. 
3 European Commission (1998), p.4.  
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·  ‘To increase efficiency by introducing competitive forces into the electricity market. 
·  Electricity price levels, at present, vary enormously between member states. This causes 
unacceptable, and unnecessary, distortions in competitive conditions across the single market. 
In addition increased efficiency leads to lower prices. This is essential; electricity in the 
European Union is more expensive than in many countries with which European industry 
trades, such as the United States and Australia. 
·  Essential public services such as ensuring electricity supply to all customers, protecting the old 
and disadvantaged, and protecting the environment, can be achieved in the competitive single 
market. Indeed, competition can improve these services if appropriate measures are taken. 
·  An interconnected market requires less reserve capacity, and reserve capacity is expensive. 
·  The introduction of competition means that electricity producers will have to make better use of 
resources in the electricity production process to avoid waste of resources; wasting resources is 
both expensive and polluting. 
·  The introduction of competition gives customers the right to choose their supplier of electricity. 
They can choose for example the nearest one, the cheapest one, the cleanest one, or the one that 
offers the best service. 
·  The lower prices for electricity result in lower production prices for European industry, which 
in turn will be translated into lower prices for products.’ 
 
Very similar reasons and also analogous objectives have been put forward by the European 
Commission by launching the single European gas market
4. Both directives include a timetable 
for opening the market for electricity and respectively gas, and factors discussing economic, 
technical and institutional requirements which are relevant for the completion of the internal 
energy market.
5 In the first benchmarking report requested by the European Council evaluating 
the progress in achieving the set objectives, the European Commission found that several 
member states opened their markets for electricity and gas above the requirements laid down in 
the directives. Additionally, the report also identified some factors hampering full competition.  
 
The main obstacles identified in this first report with regard to opening up the electricity market 
have been:
6 
·  ‘excessively high network tariffs, which form a barrier to competition by discouraging third 
party access, and may provide revenue for cross subsidy of affiliated businesses in the 
competitive market,  
·  a high level of market power of existing generation companies combined with a lack of 
liquidity in wholesale and balancing markets which is likely to expose new entrants to the risk 
of high imbalance charges,  
 
4
 See for a discussion: European Commission (2000). 
5 A detailed analysis of these directives and the associated requirements can be found for example in European 
Commission (1998) and European Commission (2000). 
6 European Commission (2001) p. 2.  
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·  network tariff structures which are not published in advance or subject to ex-ante approval, this 
may lead to uncertainty and create costly and time consuming disputes unless combined with 
full ownership unbundling, 
·  insufficient unbundling, which may obscure discriminatory charging structures and lead to 
possible cross subsidy’.  
Upon the request of the European Council a second benchmarking report was recently 
published.
7 The report shows some progress towards the implementation of the European 
electricity market, although, some severe difficulties in the process identical to those already 
mentioned in the first report remain. The following issues are identified in the case of the 
liberalisation of the electricity market in this second benchmarking report:
8 
·  ‘differential rates of market opening continue to reduce the scope of benefits to customers from 
competition, leading to higher prices than otherwise to small businesses and households, and 
also promote distortion of competition between energy companies by allowing the possibility of 
cross-subsidies at a time when companies are restructuring themselves into pan-European 
suppliers; 
·  disparities in access tariffs between network operators which, due to the lack of transparency 
caused by insufficient unbundling and inefficient regulation, may form a barrier to competition; 
·  the high level of market power among existing generating companies associated with a lack of 
liquidity in wholesale and balancing markets which impedes new entrants; 
·  insufficient interconnection infrastructure between member states and, where congestion exists, 
unsatisfactory methods for allocating scarce capacity’. 
 
Comparing the main issues revealed by the European Commission shows that some progress 
have been made, although a lot of work remains to be done before all obstacles to the internal 
energy market are removed. An even more worrying picture has been drawn in the case of 
opening of the gas market because less progress is reported in this second benchmarking 
exercise.
9 Detailed overview of the implementation of the directives in the member states is 
shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. These overviews are listing the main and probably most important 
topics and indicators necessary – but not completely sufficient - for the creation of Community-
wide markets for electricity and gas. As the tables below illustrate, apart from successes in 
promoting the internal market, different challenges are lying ahead. 
 
7
 European Commission (2002a).  
8
 European Commission (2002a) pp. 3-4. 
9
 See for a discussion about the progress of implementing the directives: European Commission (2002a) p. 5.  
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Austria   100  2001  legal  accounting  ex-ante  above average    moderate    45 
Belgium   52  2003/7  legal  legal  ex-ante  average   unfavourable      96 (2) 
Denmark   35  2003  legal  legal  ex-post  average  favourable    78 
Finland   100  1997  ownership  management  ex-post  average  favourable    45 
France   30  -  management  accounting  ex-ante  average  moderate    92 
Germany   100  1999  legal  accounting  ntpa  above average  moderate    64 
Greece   34  -  legal/mgmt  accounting  ex-ante  average  moderate    97 (1) 
Ireland   40  2005  legal/mgmt  management  ex-ante  average  moderate    97 (1) 
Italy   45  2004
a 
own/legal  legal  ex-ante  average  moderate    69 
Luxembourg               57  -  management  accounts  ex-ante  above average   unfavourable  n.a. 
Netherlands               63  2003  ownership  management  ex-ante  average  moderate    59 
Portugal   45  2003  legal  accounting  ex-ante  average  moderate    82 
Spain   55  2003  ownership  legal  ex-ante  average  favourable    83 
Sweden   100  1998  ownership  legal  ex-post  average  favourable    90 
UK   100  1998  ownership  legal  ex-ante  average  favourable    36 
                   
Notes: ntpa = negotiated third part access; 
a 
nhh = non-household customers. 
Source: European Commission (2002a) p. 5. 
 
In 2000, the Stockholm European Council requested not only the evaluation study of the 
progress achieved in completing the internal energy market so far, but also a proposal aiming to 
accelerate the liberalisation process in energy markets. The proposal was submitted by the 
European Commission in March 2001 as a draft Directive concerning ‘common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and gas’ (COM(2001)125 final – the so-called ‘Acceleration 
Directive’) and based on further comments the Commission drafted an amended proposal in 
June 2002 (COM(2002)304 final).  
 
The amended proposal plans to fully open the power markets for electricity and gas in two 
steps: all non-household customers would be free to choose their suppliers latest from January 
1, 2004, with deadline from January 1, 2005 for all customers. During the European Council 
meeting under the Danish Presidency in November 2002 the member states agreed to a 
compromise. The complete liberalisation of the electricity and gas market will be achieved in 
two steps: the markets for non-household users will be opened until July 2004 and for 
household users until July 2007. Furthermore, the member states agreed that transmission and 
distribution system operators (TSOs/DSOs) should be independent with regard to their legal  
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form, while the implementation of the unbundling requirement for DSOs can be postponed until 
July 2007. By comparing the proposed dates with the current situation presented in Tables 2.1 
and 2.2, it can be seen that no member state has to speed up the process of market opening. 


































Austria   100  2002  legal  legal  ex-ante 
under 
review  n.a.  yes 
Belgium   59  2003/6  legal  legal  ex-ante  distance  normal  unknown 
Denmark   35  2004  legal  legal  ex-post  postal  high  yes 
France   20  -  accounts  accounts  n.a.  distance  high  yes 
Germany   100  2000  accounts  accounts  ntpa  distance  high  moderate 
Ireland   82  2005  management  management  ex-ante  entry-exit  normal  unknown 
Italy   96  2003  legal  legal  ex-ante  entry-exit  normal  yes 
Luxembourg  72  -  accounts  accounts  ex-ante  postal  normal  yes 
Netherlands  60  2003  management  accounts  hybrid  distance  normal  yes 
Spain   79  2003  ownership  legal  ex-ante  postal  normal  moderate 
Sweden   47  2006  accounts  accounts  ex-post  postal  high  yes 
UK   100  1998  ownership  ownership  ex-ante  entry-exit  normal  moderate 
 
Notes: ntpa = negotiated third part access. 
Source: European Commission (2002a) p. 5. 
 
The analysis of the EU energy policy is, so far, directed to the discussion of the creation of 
Community-wide markets for electricity and gas. However, this objective is only one of the 
three main energy policy objectives of the European Community. The three core objectives of 
EU energy policy reflecting sustainable development issues, which have been established as a 
requirement for Community policy in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, are
10 
·  ‘security of supply – which aims to minimise risks and impacts of possible supply disruption on 
the EU economy and society; 
·  competitive energy systems – to ensure low cost energy for producers and consumers to 
contribute to industrial competitiveness and wider social policy objectives; 
·  environmental protection – which is integrated in both energy production and energy use to 
maintain ecological and geophysical balances in nature.’ 
The complexity of a common EU energy policy based on these core objectives is discernibly 
leading to potential problems when regarded separately. This problem has been addressed in the 
recent report prepared by NERA and commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
which tried to analyse the goals of the Electricity Directive. The authors
11 concluded that 
 
10 European Commission (1999a) p. 8. 
11 NERA (2003), p.3.  
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‘…economic efficiency appears to us to be paramount. References to security of supply and 
environmental policies appear not as high-level objectives, but as possible constraints on 
achieving economic efficiency (although economists would probably argue that the concept of 
economic efficiency can accommodate both these other aims)’. Both positive and negative 
linkages are conceivable. For example, energy efficiency improvements in generation 
technology can have a positive effect with regard to security of supply issues because of a 
reduction of the consumption of fuels, i.e. reducing import dependency. Additionally, it can 
have a positive outcome with regard to environmental protection via a reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions and other pollutants owing to the reduced consumption of fossil fuels.  
However, conflicting effects are also possible, particularly with respect to the process of 
creating Community-wide competitive energy markets. Competition and increased efficiency in 
the power generation sector can reduce electricity prices. This development can encourage 
consumers to increase electricity consumption thus contradicting the objective of environmental 
protection. Increased consumption leads to an increased emissions of greenhouse gases and 
other pollutants (such as SOx and NOx) considering that thermal convention is the main 
generation type in many EU member states. The specific environmental objective of EU energy 
policy can be further distinguished between the following three issues:  
·  reducing the environmental impact of energy production and use; 
·  promoting energy saving and energy efficiency; and 
·  increasing the share of production and use of cleaner energy. 
 
Interrelations between the different core energy policy objectives are discussed in later sections 
of the report by looking whether these objectives are congruent or whether possible conflicts 
exist in reaching them simultaneously. Before studying the most recent developments of energy 
prices in EU member states, a more detailed discussion about the policy objectives behind the 
creation of a competitive electricity market is carried out by assessing an ideal situation, 
assuming that the policy goals of electricity liberalisation would have been achieved.
12  
2.2  Conditions for a competitive electricity market 
The restructuring of the 15 national electricity market into a European electricity market is part 
of the overall goal of the European Union to create a European common market. Such common 
European markets already exist for many other goods and services, including other energy 
products such as oil. This process requires that ‘monopoly rights at national level had to be 
abolished, a legal framework to allow new market entry as well as access to the networks had to 
 
12 We concentrate on the development and situation of the electricity markets in EU Member states in the next sections 
without paying much attention on the situation of gas markets. However, a discussion whether the results identified on the 
electricity market can be transferred to the gas market can be found below.  
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be created and consumers had to be empowered to choose freely their suppliers throughout the 
EU. Energy liberalisation means thus to build single European electricity and gas markets out of 
15 isolated markets through the introduction of competition between energy suppliers for 
customers’.
13 
Probably the main task with respect to the liberalisation process is to transfer the industry from 
the quasi monopolistic towards a competitive structure. Quasi monopolistic structure was 
established owing to historical conditions meaning that the power sector was - and in some 
member states partly still is – controlled by vertically and horizontally integrated companies. 
However, the competitive structure of the European electricity markets is expected to ‘increase 
the efficient allocation of resources and enhance consumer welfare. Distortions of competition 
between substituting fuels should come to an end. Competition between suppliers should lead to 
a downward convergence of prices in Europe’.
14 
 
Economic literature has, in some length, discussed the conditions that are necessary for the 
proper functioning of competitive markets. Before some of these conditions are studied, the 
specific characteristic of electricity as a commodity must be emphasized since electricity is a 
(homogenous) commodity good, combining high demand volatility with extreme price volatility 
and limited storage ability.
15 The latter point is of special interest because temporary variations 
in demand and supply, for almost all forms of commodities, are regularly controlled via 
management of stockpiles. This function is almost impossible in the context of electricity. The 
demand and supply of electricity must be balanced at all times.  
 
Price determination in a competitive electricity market depends on the interaction of supply and 
demand of the respective commodity thus requiring availability of the surplus capacity, and 
existence of a liquid and transparent market for trade in electricity. Generally, prices in a 
competitive market will be equal to the short-run marginal cost of the most expensive plant 
which is required to satisfy the demand at that moment. The short-run marginal costs (SRMC) 
of generation usually include fuel costs as well as variable, marginal operating costs such as 
fuel handling costs. The long-run marginal costs (LRMC) of electricity generation are defined 
as the short-run marginal costs and the fixed costs that are mainly capital costs required to 
provide a capital return on capital investment. These latter costs are decisive for potential new 
market players, i.e. the market price must exceed these long-run costs for investments into new 
generating capacity.  
 
The amount of surplus or excess capacity is an important factor in determining the wholesale 
price because, in situations in which a huge surplus capacity is available, a downward price 
 
13 Albers M. (2001) p. 1. 
14 Albers M. (2001) p. 1. 
15 The limited storage ability refers to the possibility of storing electricity via hydro power in the form of hydro storage dams.  
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competition can be expected so that the price is set closely to the SRMC. On the other hand it 
can be expected that the price trend is approaching the LRMC in the case when the surplus 
capacity is very low and the competition between utilities is ceasing.  
Other decisive factors in this context are: market concentration of utilities, functional wholesale 
markets for electricity as well as interconnection capacity. The latter is insofar significant 
because the Electricity Directive promotes the creation of a Community-wide market for 
electricity instead of 15 national and isolated electricity markets. This objective is far from 
being achieved considering that only about 8 percent of total EU generation is traded between 
EU member states. One of the reasons is the lack of interconnectors which is not too surprising 
coming as a consequence of the past energy policies of creating isolated markets with national 
monopolies in the EU member states. Market concentration of utilities has, therefore, to be 
assessed as more critical for the development of an internal electricity market owing to the 
potential of exerting strategic pricing behaviour. Market concentration is not only a feature for 
the individual national markets but must also be perceived as a feature of the increase of 
multinational alliances in the power sector in Europe. An intuitive example describing this 
feature of market concentration in the supply business is recorded in a report published by the 
European Commission in so far, as market concentration is expressed in market shares of 
electricity suppliers: ‘… the concentration indicators are based on non-consolidated, direct 
market share, not taking into account indirect shareholdings, the concentration indicators for 
some countries (for example, Germany) are relatively low’
16. The share of the market leader of 
the German market, RWE, was reported to be about 14% in 1999 in the case of RWE being a 
single company. The market share of the RWE Group was around 30%, if taking into account 
companies in which RWE held a stake. During the most recent years the biggest European 
utilities continue increasing their stakes in companies in other European countries, which is the 
logical and probably anticipated consequence of a competitive European electricity market with 
free access of suppliers.  
 
The determination of the costs for meeting demand for electricity follows the merit order 
stacking power stations in order of short-run marginal costs (SRMC) so that the cheapest power 
plant, i.e. the power plants with the lowest SRMC, is generating electricity first and the most 
expensive last. Based on this merit order it is clear that the ownership of the mid-merit plant 
which can be generally identified as the price-setter has a favourable position to influence the 
overall price level. In cases of high market concentration of the supply side the situation can get 
even worse because of influencing even higher control via capacity management schemes such 
as plant mothballing.
17 However, a crucial factor for determining the SRMC and consequently 
the merit order is the energy mix used for electricity generation in the different countries. Table 
 
16
 European Commission (2001b) p. 107. 
17 
The increase in market concentration resulting from the two mergers in the German electricity sector in 2000 can serve 
as a good example for such a development. Two German leading utilities, E.ON and RWE, announced capacity closure 
programmes with the consequence of increasing generation price and spot market prices.  
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A.1 in the Annex reveals that technologies used for electricity generation vary between EU 
member states. Countries, such as Belgium and France, are relying mostly on thermal nuclear 
compared to countries in which the biggest share of electricity is generated in conventional 
thermal power plants (the Netherlands and Denmark). Hydro power provides the majority of 
electricity in Austria, Sweden and Norway. These technologies have also quite different costs
18 
thereby clearly influencing the SRMC. 
 
It was obvious from the beginning of the liberalisation process of the electricity market that, 
apart from opening-up the market for competition on the generation and supply level, regulatory 
instruments have to be implemented to guarantee the creation of an internal market. The legal 
basis for the Electricity and Gas Directives are the internal market rules (Article 95 EC Treaty). 
These regulatory instruments and institutions are of great importance in areas where no 
competitive market structures are being introduced, such as the case of network tarification, 
unbundling of network operators and balancing requirements.
19 
 
Some of the factors obstructing the existence of a competitive electricity markets are discussed 
in later chapters in more detail. The listing of such economical, technical and institutional 
factors is far from exhaustive, but it certainly shows the complexity the political decision-
makers are facing in the process of transforming 15 isolated national electricity markets, often 
controlled by publicly owned vertically integrated companies, into a European, competitive 
electricity market.  
2.3  Recent developments in energy prices and the main components 
One of the underlying objectives of the Electricity Directive is to liberalise electricity markets 
by integrating national markets into one European market. This process aims at increasing 
competition between energy generators and suppliers leading to enhanced efficiency and 
productivity gains which are closely associated with lower production costs as well as lower 
electricity prices. Nevertheless, the overall result of the liberalisation process cannot simply be 
reduced to the concept of lower electricity prices for final consumers, i.e. households as well as 
industry, etc. The same has been clarified in a recent communication of the European 
Commission: ‘To refute a common misconception, the internal energy market does not only 
seek systematically to reduce prices to consumers, but to set a fair price in compliance with 
 
18 The specific costs of the electricity generation mix are estimated to be around 20 EUR/MWh (nuclear power); 20 
EUR/MWh (lignite), 45 EUR/MWh (domestic hard coal), 30 EUR/MWh (natural gas); 30 EUR/MWh (hydro power); 30 
EUR/MWh (waste and biomass); 50 EUR/MWh (photovoltaics, solarthermal) and 91 EUR/MWh (wind): in: Auer J. (2002) 
  See for a detailed discussion of these regulatory bodies and instruments in place: Albers M. (2001), European Commission 
(1998), and European Commission (2002a). 
19 See for a detailed discussion of these regulatory bodies and instruments in place: Albers M. (2001), European 
Commission (1998), and European Commission (2002a).  
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public service obligations’.
20 However, the European Commission does not answer the question 
what a ‘fair price’ would be and what does the European Commission understand with the 
phrase of ‘systematically reduce prices to consumers’? 
Furthermore, the creation of an internal electricity market should lead to a downward 
convergence of electricity prices between EU member states. This development is expected to 
come along with the current transition from the often quasi monopolistic national electricity 
market of the past to a competitive market of the future. This change in the market structure is 
generally associated with increased efficiency in the whole electricity supply industry. A 
liberalised and competitive electricity market is certainly positive with regard to improved 
welfare for the citizen.  
 
Table 2.3 below compares the change of electricity retail prices (expressed in end-user prices 
with taxes and without taxes) for industry and households during the time period 1995 to 2001.  
Table 2.3  Development of electricity prices and demand 
      Change in retail price    Change in  
      1995-2001        1995-2001          consumption 
      Industry         Households  1995-99 
  without tax (%)  with tax (%)  without tax (%)  with tax (%)  % change 
           
Austria (1)  - 8  7  -7  2  7 
Belgium   - 3  -3  -4  -3  9 
Denmark   29  31  29  40  3 
Finland   - 17  -8  -9  1  14 
France   -15  -17  -9  -11  9 
Germany   -29  -25  -5  2  3 
Greece   0  -8  -13  -20  20 
Ireland   5  5  8  8  27 
Italy   46  28  5  3  10 
Luxembourg   -18  -12  5  10  10 
Netherlands (2)  8  37  2  18  14 
Portugal   -19  -19  -5  -5  25 
Spain   -25  -21  -19  -15  26 
Sweden (3)  -6  6  -25  -24  1 
UK   9  9  -11  -13  9 
Norway   -2  0  19  29  4 
           
Notes: price changes are expressed in nominal terms; (1) Households 1996-2001, Industry 1995-1999; (2) 1995-2000; (3) 1996-2001. 
Source: European Commission (2001a). 
 
The data presented in Table 2.3 show no unanimous development, i.e. a reduction in retail 
prices can be recorded in some, while retail prices increased in other countries during this 
period. This result is certainly not surprising considering that the liberalisation process of the 
electricity market is in different stages in the EU member states, with the process starting in the 
 
20 European Commission (2002b) p. 8.  
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UK and the Scandinavian countries already in the early 1990s. Furthermore, different 
developments between industrial and household prices occurred within the same country, for 
example in Italy, as well as between the prices with and without taxes, an example being 
Austria. The range of price changes is quite high; i.e. the biggest reduction in retail prices 
including taxes for industry is reported for Germany with 25% and the biggest increase for the 
Netherlands with 37%. The latter must be ascribed to the introduction of energy taxes in the 
Netherlands during this period. Quite interesting is a development of the industrial prices in 
Italy because the percentage increase in the price without tax was much higher than the increase 
with tax. A reduction in industrial electricity prices has been reported in 8 of the 15 EU member 
states during this time period. The situation is quite similar with respect to the prices for 
households. The electricity price paid by Danish households increased by 40%, thus 
representing the highest increase in EU member states. The biggest reduction occurred in 
Greece (20%) and Sweden (24%).  
An interesting aspect is that in some member states the percentage change in retail prices 
including taxes has offset the reduction in the retail price. For example, the retail price in 
Austria reduced by 8 percent (industry) and 7 percent (households), while the end-user price 
increased by 7 percent (industry) and 2 percent (households). This development has to be 
attributed to a change in the tax policy in Austria: increase and / or introduction of taxes (VAT 
or energy) during this period. The same development occurred in Finland and Germany 
concerning household electricity prices.  
 
Taxes can be used as a policy tool for different reasons: they can have a revenue-generating 
function and / or they are introduced for environmental reasons. The latter aspect is, in 
particular, interesting in this report because taxes can offset potential conflicts between 
diverging objectives. Reduced electricity prices leading to an increase in electricity demand as a 
result of increased efficiency at the generation stage and competition can be subject to some 
form of taxation aiming to fully internalise the external costs of electricity generation. Such a 
policy approach would be in accordance with the policy of European Commission because the 
European Commission adopted the policy of internalisation of external costs in the sixth 
environment action programme.  
 
Besides being market-based instruments for achieving the policy of internalisation, it should not 
be forgotten that taxes are also revenue generating tool. Other fiscal measures very high on the 
political agenda are tradable emission permits and emission trading.
21  
The formation of the end-user prices depends on these different price components which not 
only differ between countries but also differ between users in the same country. Prices are 
generally composed of three components: the commodity price (i.e. the costs of electricity 
 
21
 European Commission (2001c), the results of the meeting of the European environment ministers December, 9 2002; and 
Mannaerts H. and M. Mulder (2003).  
  22 
generation), the transport costs (i.e. transmission and distribution costs) and the tax component 
which can be divided into energy or environmentally related taxes and VAT.
22 The Dutch 
Energy Research Foundation divided the electricity prices of different EU member states in 
these components and found that the percentage share of these components is quite different. 
The biggest share in the Danish end-user price is determined by the eco-tax which does not 
exist in countries such as Belgium and the United Kingdom. It is also worthwhile to note that 
the share of transport costs is the biggest cost driver in Germany which is completely in contrast 
to the UK situation where this component is almost negligible. The relevance of the transport 
cost is more pronounced in the industrial electricity prices, which is not necessarily of great 
surprise considering the relatively low tax burden for industrial users.  
 
These findings are quite significant revealing that a detailed analysis requires a separate 
discussion about the driving forces behind the different price components. The development of 
transport costs is of central significance when the creation of a Community-wide electricity 
market is discussed. Vertically-integrated energy companies have also been responsible for the 
transport of energy (i.e. transmission and distribution) in the past and are still responsible in 
some EU member states. This situation already started to change as part of the liberalisation of 
energy markets (electricity and gas) and will be discussed further below because of the possible 
consequences towards the determination of prices. A further facet of electricity price 
determination worth to be noted - but not necessarily unexpected - is the fact that eco-taxes play 
almost no role in the end-user prices of large-scale industrial consumers, i.e. energy-intensive 
industries. The generation of electricity quite independent of fuel uses causes some form of 
external costs to the environment. The European Commission in the sixth environment action 
programme emphasises that these external costs should be internalised, i.e. included in energy 
prices. Research in the area of environmental taxation clearly shows that this policy approach of 
internalising external effects applies more to households than to industries. The main reason for 
the different treatment of electricity users can be linked to economic consideration, i.e. high 
electricity price levels are often set equal to a loss of competitiveness in international trade.
23  
2.4  Summary  
The rationale of creating a Community-wide market for electricity and gas follows the 
underlying EU principle of establishing European-wide common market for goods and services. 
This policy approach should lead to a general increase in the citizens’ welfare. One of the 
measures to achieve this overall objective is to increase efficiency through the introduction of 
competition into the electricity supply chain. Additionally, this policy intends to intensify 
competition between suppliers throughout the EU leading to a convergence of prices at a lower 
 
22 See for a discussion and an overview Energy Research Foundation (2001) p. 73. 
23 See for a discussion: Barker T. and J. Köhler (eds) (1998) and Ekins P. and S. Speck (1999).  
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level. However, it can be argued that the evolution and creation of competitive energy market 
based on this scenario is probably not easy to achieve. Some of the basic conditions for 
realising full competition are not straightforward to be implemented because of the specific 
characteristics of electricity as a commodity. Furthermore, the energy markets and in particular 
the electricity markets have been protected in a strict legislative framework by creating often 
monopolistic market structure; i.e. the markets were regularly controlled by vertically integrated 
companies which, in addition, were sometimes state-owned.  
There is no doubt about the progress made with respect to opening of these market structures by 
launching the liberalisation of the electricity market. The launch started with the transposition 
of the Electricity Directive into the national legislation. However, as the European Commission 
concedes, some severe obstacles hampering the creation of competitive, common electricity 
market do exist and some of these obstacles are discussed in the following chapters. 
  
  24  
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3  Factors Influencing the Development of Competition  
3.1  Introduction 
Existence of asymmetries in the electricity markets in EU member states is certainly not 
surprising. Vertically integrated monopolistic companies have regularly dominated the 
electricity supply chain. Such structures are still in place in some countries, although they 
clearly contradict the idea and conditions necessary for creating a competitive electricity 
market.  
In a recent report commissioned by the European Commission, activities along the supply chain 
were divided into two categories by considering their potential openness to competition:
24 
·  ‘(potentially) competitive activities, mostly in the upstream generation market and the 
downstream supply market; and 
·  (naturally) monopolistic network activities primarily present at the transmission and distribution 
network level.’ 
 
Based on this classification it seems quite straightforward to establish the areas within the 
supply chain where competition can and should take place. As discussed above, numerous 
technical, economical and institutional factors have an obvious influence in the price formation 
and creation of competitive markets.  
 
The purpose of this section is to study in more detail the following factors:  
·  network capacity restrictions and the access to networks; 
·  the degree of concentration; and  
·  environmental policy issues.  
These features are regularly identified as obstacles for the opening of the electricity market to 
full competition (see Section 2.2). Furthermore, they were referred to as potential barriers in the 
Electricity and Gas Directives, as well as in the two benchmarking reports published by the 
European Commission. 
3.2  Network capacity restrictions and the access to networks 
One of the main requirements for the operation of a competitive energy market is the non-
discriminatory and cost reflective access to the existing electricity networks both domestically 
and on the pan-European level. The European Commission made it clear in the first benchmark 
report that serious interconnection bottlenecks are a major constraint regarding the development 
of a pan-European electricity market.  
 
24 European Commission (2001b) p. 7.  
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However, the entire area of electricity transport, i.e. interconnection of national markets, 
transmission and distribution operations, is generally characterised as a monopolistic network 
activity as it seems not economically viable to build up a competitive second infrastructure. 
This situation is undoubtedly demanding a strong and independent regulatory reform to 
guarantee the third party access to the whole system in a transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner. Furthermore, it has to be considered that network capacity restrictions can occur either 
on the national, or the regional level. Effective and fair interconnector access arrangements are 
required and are decisive for the completion of the single Community-wide competitive 
electricity market.  
This issue has to be seen as critical for the creation of domestic competitive markets. Otherwise 
existing market dominance of domestic market players would be reinforced what would 
undoubtedly impede foreign companies entering a domestic market through sales of electricity 
via cross-border interconnectors.  
However, trade in electricity is still relatively low on the EU level (around 8% of EU electricity 
consumption in 2000). The low trade figure can be attributed to the historical organisation of 
quasi isolated national markets. The network activities were, in the past, treated as natural 
monopolies and generally less progress can be reported in unbundling market power of 
generators over the transmission and distribution grids. Unbundling is identified as one of the 
major principles for introducing competition as it guarantees that new generators can have 
indiscriminate access to the transmission grid and it averts cross-subsidisation of generation 
activities by transmission activities. For example, relatively high profits are made by the large 
vertically (generation and transmission) integrated utilities in Germany which are in private 
ownership.
25 In other countries, such as in the Nordic countries and the UK, separate grid 
operators are responsible for the transmission and distribution networks. Besides the question of 
network ownership, the issue of regulation is of significant importance: whether an independent 
regulator is responsible for questions relating to the network and, in particular, to network 
tarification.  
In both benchmarking studies
26 the European Commission argued that some forms of network 
restrictions could hamper the creation of competitive energy market. In particular, excessively 
high network tariffs mentioned in the reports are examples of discouraging third party access 
and providing the possibility of cross subsidisation. However, the European Commission 
clarifies: ‘These disparities in tariffs do not, per se, form a barrier to competition provided that 
they are transparent and non-discriminatory. However, in some cases transparency is also 




25 Haas R. (2002). 
26 European Commission (2001a) and European Commission (2002a). 
27 European Commission (2002a) p. 11.  
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Network tarification 
The issues of third party access to the network and network tarification are described by the 
European Commission as the ‘main obstacles in arriving at a fully operational internal 
market’.
28 Keeping in mind the different components of the final end-user price for electricity, 
as discussed in the Section 2.3, shows that the setting of network tariffs has considerable effects 
on electricity prices.
29 
Table 3.1  Estimated level of network charges (unit: EUR/MWh) 
                           Medium voltage                     Low voltage 
  Estimated  Approx.  Estimated  Approx. 
  average charge  range  average  range 
    high - low  charge  high - low 
         
Austria   20  15 - 25  65  50 – 80 
Belgium   15  n.a.     
Denmark   15  n.a.  25  Unknown 
Finland   15  10-20  35  Unknown 
France   15  n.a.  50  n.a. 
Germany   25  15 - 45  55  40 - 75 
Greece   15  n.a.     
Ireland   10  n.a.  40  n.a. 
Italy   10  n.a.     
Luxembourg   20  n.a.     
Netherlands   10  unknown  35  unknown 
Portugal   15  n.a.     
Spain   15  n.a.  45  n.a. 
Sweden   10  5-15  40  20 - 60 
UK   unknown  10-15  40  30 - 50 
         
Source: European Commission, 2002a 
 
Table 3.1 reveals the differences in the average tariffs applying in EU member states by 
distinguishing between medium and low voltage. It is not unexpected that network charges paid 
by households (low voltage) are generally higher in all EU member states. Sometimes these are 
more than double the amount paid by industrial users (medium voltage) connected only to 
medium or high voltage network. Furthermore, the range of low voltage charges is higher than 
is the case for medium-voltage customer. Apart from Austria, Germany and Luxembourg, the 
estimated average charge for medium voltage is in EU member states from 10 EUR/MWh to 15 
EUR/MWh. As stated in the table, these charge rates are only estimates serving as an indicative 
example of the differences between EU member states. However, a closely connected question 
is whether we can expect that these tariffs will in the future somehow converge. This would be 
necessary if the policy objectives of converging electricity prices would be achieved. This issue 
 
28 European Commission (2002c) p. 15. 
29 See for a detailed analysis of the situation with respect of tariffs for transmission of electricity in EU member states: 
European Commission (2002d).  
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has some relevance in the creation of competition because high charges can be a barrier for new 
players emerging of the electricity market.  
From the launch of the Electricity Directive as well as the Gas Directive it was anticipated that 
they did not address all fundamental issues decisive for the creation of internal electricity and 
gas market. For these reasons the European Commission initiated a process of setting up the 
Electricity Regulatory Forum in 1998 (the Florence Regulatory Process).
30 On the agenda of the 
Florence forum are questions of cross border trade, in particular the concern of tarification of 
cross border electricity exchanges, and the allocation of scarce interconnection capacities. The 
outcomes of these process will be important for the future evolution of energy prices and the 
internal market. In the meantime, some progress has been achieved with regard to tarification of 
cross-border electricity transactions: all transit and import charges have been removed and 
instead a single export charge of 1 EUR/MWh has been approved as a temporary solution
31. 
There is generally an agreement that a permanent framework has to be adopted. This 
development must be recognised as a success story since different and uncoordinated systems 
of charges that has obviously hampered competition, such as pan caking, have been abolished.  
Lack of interconnector capacities 
One of the major constraints in developing a pan-European electricity market is the current lack 
of interconnector capacities between EU member states. This situation separates markets across 
Europe leading to critical bottlenecks and preventing competition and price convergence across 
the borders. These constraints are in particular noticeable for some countries or regions, such as 
the regions of the Nordic countries (total import capacity is around 2.5% of total installed 
capacity) with countries outside, England and Wales (total import capacity is around 6% of total 
installed capacity), Spain (total import capacity is less than 4% of total installed capacity – the 
same holds true for Portugal). Although having a higher interconnection capacity (around 14%) 
Italy is a bottleneck due to reasons discussed below. The issue of the low interconnection 
capacity and low trade figures between EU member states has been addressed in the 
conclusions of the European Council meeting in Barcelona in 2002 when the minimum level of 
external interconnection capacity for national electricity networks was established at 10 percent 
of installed generating capacity by 2005. Furthermore, the Community financial support 
mechanisms have been revised in the light of this new target insofar as the Energy and Industry 
Council approved the revision of the TEN-Energy Guidelines proposing that the maximum 
ceiling for possible EU co-financing increased from 10% to 20% of total investment costs of 
priority projects.  
 
30
 See for further information: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/elec_single_market/florence/index_en.html; the analogue 
to the Electricity Regulatory Forum is the Gas Regulatory Forum (also called Madrid Regulatory Process) dealing with 
issues relevant to gas exchange and cross-border questions see for further information: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/gas_single_market/madrid.html  
31
 Proposals were made to reduce the charge to 0.5 EUR/MWh – see the (draft) conclusion of the 9th meeting of the 
Florence Regulatory Forum at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/elec_single_market/florence/index_en.html  
  29 
A different situation concerning trade in electricity can be found in the region covering 
Germany, France, Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, where quite an intense trade of 
electricity takes place. It is undisputable that without having sufficient interconnection capacity 
and an efficient regulatory framework in place no real competition will occur neither on the 
pan-European level nor on the national level.  
Conclusion 
The European Commission concluded in its first benchmarking report that there is a lot to be 
done regarding the establishment of an efficient framework for cross-border exchanges of 
electricity. Issues which are clearly obstacles in the process of establishing internal energy 
markets and hampering the development of cost-reflective pricing structures are the missing co-
ordination of TSOs concerning capacity allocation of electricity interconnectors (capacity 
reservation and congestion management) and tarification mechanisms
32: 
Congestion is clearly an obstacle to the creation of an integrated EU electricity market. Most 
interconnectors are already used intensively without significantly affecting the spread of prices 
in the Community. However although progress has been made, there also remain regulatory 
obstacles to efficient cross border exchanges and a lack of co-ordination of capacity allocation 
and tarification mechanisms.  
 
This subject of insufficient interconnection infrastructure and in addition unsatisfactory 
methods of allocation of scarce capacity has been followed up in the second benchmarking 




This analysis of network capacity restrictions confirms some of the challenges ahead in the 
process of creating a Community-wide electricity market. Apart from the pure infrastructure 
measures, i.e. the extension of the current - insufficient - interconnection capacity, further 
changes in the institutional framework are required. For example, there is a need to harmonise 
the often country-specific approaches of allocating interconnector capacity. A strong regulatory 
framework is another precondition for competition on the national market regarding network 
access and tarification. This latter aspect is of significant relevance for guaranteeing non-
discriminatory and cost reflective access to the domestic electricity networks. However, policies 
allowing unhindered third party access must be investigated in the context of market 
concentration, another potential barrier to the creation of competitive electricity market. 
 
32
 European Commission (2001a) p. 105. 
33
 European Commission (2002a) pp. 3-4. Almost the same problems hold true in the context of the cross-border exchange 
of gas: ‘To date there is very little transparency regarding the availability of capacity and no real co-ordination of tarification 
in order to facilitate cross-border trade of gas’ (European Commission (2001a) p. 107).  
  30 
3.3  Market Concentration 
Another key obstacle to competition is the high level of market power of existing generation 
and supply companies in the electricity market. This situation has to be seen as detrimental in 
the process of developing competitive market, particularly regarding the potential entry of new 
players into a market dominated by incumbents. The opening up and creation of a competitive 
energy market should be accompanied by the occurrence of new players reducing the market 
share of the incumbents. Parts of the electricity supply chain in some EU member states are still 
maintaining a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure clearly contradicting the intention of 
creating competitive markets.  
 
The concentrations of the electricity generation as well as electricity supply in EU member 
states are presented in Table 3.2. There is obviously a clear correlation between the process of 
market opening and high concentration as a comparison between the findings of Table 3.2 and 
Table 2.1: Countries lagging to open-up their markets, such as Belgium, France, Ireland and 
Portugal, have a dominating utility. Furthermore, it is interesting to follow the development in 
Italy on one, and Germany on the other hand. The process of divestment shows to be successful 
in Italy where the share of the dominating player Enel was reduced from around 78% to around 
54% in 2002. However, the development in Germany is in strict contrast to the Italian case 
because the degree of market concentration increased during the recent years. 
Table 3.2  Market concentration in total national electricity generation – 1999/2000 (in % of total generation 
capacity) 
                                Market share(s) of:   
  the largest   the three largest 
  generator  generators 
     
Austria   45  65 
Belgium   87  95 
Denmark   27  45 
Finland   27  46 
France   90  92 
Germany (2002)  24 (31)  57 (71) 
Greece   98  100 
Ireland   95  n.a. 
Italy (2002)  78 (54)  83 (76) 
Luxembourg   14  37 
Netherlands   19  49 
Portugal   69  84 
Spain (2001)  42 (39)  82 (78) 
Sweden   50  86 
UK (2001)  16 (14)  38 (40) 
Norway   32  45 
 
Source: European Commission (2001b) and Morgan Stanley Equity Research (2002)  
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One of the basic principles of competition is to possess a large number of competing companies 
guaranteeing that no single company can influence the price and exercise any form of market 
power. Owing to the specific characteristics of electricity as a good that cannot be stored, an 
additional condition for competition is a requirement for having excess capacities in generation.  
The political decisions of release programmes (divestment programmes) carried out in some 
member states, i.e. the UK, Italy and Spain, are examples of how countries try to mitigate the 
consequences of this challenge (see also the discussion in the country chapters below). The first 
country gaining some experiences with such release programmes has been the UK in the 1990s. 
The English electricity market has been dominated by two companies which have been broken-
up in smaller companies. This development was partly enforced by the UK government. These 
two utilities dominated the price setting in the English wholesale market. One of the results of 
the privatisation programme was the creation of twelve independent regional electricity 
companies in England and Wales. Furthermore, new entrants invested into new capacity, 
mainly combined cycle gas fired generation driven by the ‘dash for gas’ policy of the UK 
government leading to an oversupplied market in England and Wales. These two features, a 
highly fragmented generation market and an oversupply of electricity, triggered a sharp fall of 
the electricity price levels during the last years. This low degree of market concentration 
hinders any form of price setting and exerting market power by a single utility. The situation of 
the English electricity market corresponds to the conditions and requirements necessary for 
having a competitive electricity market analysed above. In the meantime, many of the smaller 
electricity companies have been taken over by other European companies, such as EdF, RWE 
and E.ON, as part of the ‘Europaisation’ of the electricity market (see Table 3.5 below). 
Other policies aimed at overcoming the potential danger of high market concentration are 
regulatory measures and the creation of power exchanges installed in many member states. The 
latter is essential because electricity trade on power exchanges leads to a transparent and non-
discriminatory price formation which itself can be seen as a prerequisite for the liberalisation 
process and the creation of an internal market.  
 
No unambiguous evidence for the assumption that high level of market power impedes 
competition has been put forward. For example, the Swedish Government commissioned a 
study examining the relation between market power and competition based on the Swedish 
situation and found out that there are ‘risks of inefficient competition, although there is no 
evidence that companies are using their market power towards their own ends’
34. However, the 
possibility of exerting market power by dominant players, in particular by these companies who 
are operating mid merit (price-setting) plants, can – in the long-run - be seen as a real threat for 
a competitive market.  
 
 
34 Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 2.  
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Correlation between high degrees of concentration and electricity prices 
A comparison between the number of generators of domestic markets in EU member states and 
the electricity end-user prices paid by industry or households in these countries does not show 
that markets with high concentration, i.e. low number of generators or suppliers, lead directly to 
higher end-user prices in 2000. The analysis of market concentration is generally done using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This Index has been calculated by Morrison (2002)
 35 who 
found that a single dominant generator (HHI: 8,000 – 10,000) exists in Belgium, France, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal (high concentration); 2-3 large dominant generators (HHI: 2,400 – 
4,000) in Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (medium concentration); and no 




This result should be treated with care as it only describes the situation on the electricity market 
at a certain time. Dynamic considerations, such as the possibility of strategic pricing behaviour 
in the medium-to long-run, i.e. a typical behavioural response as the result of a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market structure, are not taken into account in such a static analysis. 
Table 3.3  Correlation between HH-Index and electricity prices for households between European 
countries in 2000 
Price excl. all taxes  HH-Index  Price incl. all taxes  HH-Index 
  (EUR/MWh)    (EUR/MWh) 
           
UK   158  low       Denmark   238  low (medium) 
Belgium   152  high       Norway   192  low (low) 
Norway   146  low       Belgium   186  high 
Germany   141  medium       Germany   179  medium 
Portugal   138  high       UK   166  low 
Netherlands   116  medium       Sweden   150  low (medium) 
Spain   115  medium       Netherlands   149  medium 
Ireland   114  high       France   147  high 
Austria   113  medium       Portugal   146  high 
France   112  high       Austria   145  medium 
Denmark   105  low (medium)       Spain   141  medium 
Sweden   102  low (medium)       Ireland   128  high 
Finland   83  low (medium)       Finland   110  low (medium) 
Italy   67  medium       Italy   83  medium 
Greece   66  high       Greece   71  high 
 
Source: Eurostat 2000, Electricity Prices for Households on 1 January 2000 (household category Db) 
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 Morrison M.B. (2002) p. 4. The Herfindahl – Hirschman index is generally distinguished between unconcentrated 
(HHI<1,000), moderately concentrated (1,000<HHI<1,800) and highly concentrated (HHI>1,800). Unfortunately, this 
classification does not completely correspond to Morrison’s approach.  
36 
A slightly different classification is the outcome of subdividing the single Nordic market into the four national markets: the 
Norwegian market has no dominant generator compared to the other three markets which belong to the criteria ‘medium 
concentration’ (based on Morrison’s classification); see for further information: Chapter IV.1.  
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Table 3.4  Correlation between HH-Index and electricity prices for industry between European countries in 
2000 
  Price excl. all taxes  HH-Index    Price incl. all taxes   HH-Index 
  (EUR/MWh)    (EUR/MWh) 
           
Austria (1)  112  medium       Austria (1)  143  medium 
Belgium   73  high       Italy   104  medium 
Italy   69  medium       Denmark   91  low (medium) 
Ireland   66  high       Belgium   89  high 
UK   66  low       Spain   78  medium 
Portugal   64  high       UK   77  low 
Spain   64  medium       Ireland   74  high  
Greece   57  high       Portugal   68  high 
France   57  high       France   66  high 
Germany   52  medium       Germany   63  medium 
Denmark   50  low (medium)       Netherlands   62  medium 
Netherlands   50  medium      Greece   62  high 
Finland   38  low (medium)       Finland   51  low (medium) 
Sweden   37  low (medium)       Sweden   47  low (medium) 
Norway   36  low (low)       Norway   44  low (low) 
 
Notes: (1) prices are presented for industry category Ie (annual consumption 2,000,000 kWh – maximum demand 500 kW) with the 
exception of Austria Ic (annual consumption 160,000 kWh – maximum demand 100 kW) 
Source: Eurostat 2000, Electricity Prices for Industry on 1 January 2000  
 
The findings of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggest no unambiguous correlation between electricity 
prices and the degree of concentration on the electricity generation level for the year 2000. This 
result is definitely relevant for the analysis for the households (Table 3.3) but only with some 
caveats for industry. For example, the degree of concentration is rather low in the three Nordic 
countries (Finland, Sweden and Norway). In addition, industries in these countries were 
experiencing the lowest electricity prices. The situation is quite the opposite for the fourth 
Nordic country (Denmark): a low HHI associated with high end-user electricity prices both for 
households and industry. It is important to consider that the prices excluding taxes in Denmark, 
compared to the majority of other EU member states are low, while the prices including taxes 
are one of the highest in the EU. This fact can be ascribed to the fiscal system, i.e. energy taxes 
levied on the use of electricity.  
 
A detailed analysis of the relationship between the degree of market concentration and price 
development requires a dynamic approach. The potential risks associated with high market 
concentration have different facets and can affect development of competition in many different 
ways. As discussed in Chapter 2.2 the evolution of the long-run marginal costs are decisive for 
investment decisions and should therefore be seen in the context of market entry of new market 
players. In case prices are lower than these costs – which dominant market players may 
influence– no investment into new generation capacity will be made and the status quo will 
remain.   
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The comparison of the development on the UK vs. the German market can serve as an example 
for some form of strategic behaviour resulting from the recent increase in market concentration. 
The UK market can be described as a market with a low degree of market concentration and 
with an oversupply (excess capacity) of generated electricity. This situation differs from the 
German market where the market concentration increased recently. The two biggest electricity 
generators (E.ON and RWE) were created through mergers, resulting in an increase of their 
market power. Following the finalisation of these mergers the two utilities mothballed 
generation capacity leading to an increase in the prices at the power exchange (see Chapter 3.4). 
Haas (2002) spells out, such a policy of a reduction of excess capacity can be characterised as a 
quite common result at the beginning of the liberalisation process
37: ‘First, prices decrease due 
to efficiency gains but after a short period of time they start to increase considerably, mainly 
due to the exertion of market power and a lack of excess capacities …’ 
The structure of the electricity supply industry may be of greater relevance for guaranteeing a 
competitive electricity market in the medium- to long-run. The present situation with high 
concentration and excess generating capacity in many EU member states can further hamper the 
entry of new market players because generation prices tend to be below full cost recovery for 
new competitors.  
Table 3.5  The Internalisation / Europaisation of electricity generators 
Company  Nationality 
Percentage 
of EU market    Owned by     Key strategic ownership 
         
EdF  France   17     100% State owned 
   ASA -Austria; Dalkia-France; Edison; Italenergua;  
   London Electric; EnBW 
RWE  Germany   9.7     Private     Innogy (UK) 
E.ON  Germany   9     Private 
   Bayernwerk, Preussen Elektra, VEAG (all Germany); 
   Sydkraft (Sweden); PowerGen (UK) 
ENEL  Italy   8     100% State owned     Elcogas (Spain) 
Vattenfall  Sweden   5     100% State owned 
   HEW, VEAG, Laubag,  Bewag (all Germany); Finnish  
   and Baltic States 
Electrabel  Belgium   2.7 
   Tractebel (40%) 
   Communis (5%)  
   Hidrocantabrico (Spain); Belgo-Nucleaire; Epon  
   (Netherlands) 
         Tractebel Suez 
Endesa  Spain   2.6     Private     Enersis; NRE (Netherlands); SNET (France) 
British 
Energy  UK   2.6     Private     Active in US market 
Iberola  Spain   2.3     Private 2% EdP     Enipower (Italy); Iberdrola-Tractobel 
EnBW  Germany   2     EdF part owned     Hidrocantabrico 
Fortum  Finland   1.8     50% State owned     Ivo; Neste; Gasum 
     
Source: Turmes C. (2002)     
 
During the recent years several big mergers in the utility sector took place: in 1999, around 17 
very large operators existed and nowadays only 11. The danger resulting from a high degree of 
 
37 Haas R. (2002) p. 3.  
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concentration within the electricity supply industry concerning the creation of an internal and 
competitive electricity market is also found in the NERA study
38 current trends would lead to a 
European electricity market far removed from the goals of liberalisation. If these trends were 
left unchecked, a few large (and probably state-owned) companies would end up either 
operating in all markets or dominating national markets, in a return to vertically integrated 
monopolies’. The number of electricity generators in most EU member states has decreased 
over time with the tendency of creating larger electricity generators by taking over and or 
acquiring stakes in other generators in EU member states as well as in the candidate countries. 
The fast pace of mergers and take-overs in this sector can especially be observed by considering 
that the money spent on acquisitions by the biggest European utilities (EdF, E.ON, RWE, Enel, 
Vattenfall, Endesa and Electrabel) increased from around 3.5 billion EUR in the late 1990s to 
42 billion EUR in 2001. 
 
The development of creating multi-national utilities must partly be seen in the context of the 
completion of the internal European market, a process of integrating the national markets into a 
single European market. The current development shows a new orientation of utilities by 
differentiating their portfolio; i.e. investing into areas such as telecommunications, water and 
gas supply. The Dutch energy companies, which are quite small on the European wide scale, 
realise the danger of the current liberalisation process and estimates are saying that around nine 
multinationals will survive this development requiring about seven million connections as the 
minimum customer base.
39  
Taking into account that only about 8% of total electricity consumption has been traded 
between EU member states in 2000, the discussion of becoming a single European market is 
probably too early. The current process shows a decreasing number of players at the national 
market further hampering the entry of new competitors.  
 
The Scandinavian experience with the creation of the Nordic electricity market (Nord Pool) can 
be seen as a successful approach of integrating domestic markets into a regional one – at least 
for the time being. The individual markets of the four participating countries Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden are – based on the HH index – moderate or highly concentrated while the 
integrated market can be characterised as unconcentrated. However, the number of generators 
alone does not guarantee an open market and as Mannaerts and his colleagues conclude: 
‘sufficient trans-boundary transmission capacity and free access to the foreign electricity grid 




NERA, (2003), p.ii. 
39
 Energy Research Foundation (ECN) (2002) p. 46. 
40 
Mannaerts H., M. Lijesen and M. Mulder (2002) p. 15.  
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Summary  
One of the most important principles for creating competition is a low degree of concentration 
within the electricity supply industry. This implies the existence of many companies in the 
market thus guaranteeing that no single company can influence the market price and exercise 
market power. The above analysis reveals an inconsistent picture of the current situation: 
market concentration is still very high in some countries, such as France, Belgium, Italy and 
Greece, which are normally lacking behind in opening their electricity market compared to the 
forerunners, such as Austria, Finland, Germany and the UK. However, it is not possible to draw 
a general conclusion that electricity users in countries with a high degree of concentration are 
facing higher prices compared to the users in countries with a low concentration at the 
generators level. As our analysis shows, this is not surprising since many different factors, such 
as the electricity generation mix and availability of excess capacities, are influencing the price 
formation. However, the potential problems and barriers to competition associated with a high 
degree of concentration have to be analysed in a dynamic timeframe. As a result of takeovers 
and mergers in the EU member states the number of generators is decreasing. This could lead to 
quite a low number of international market players in the near future which some scholars are 
predicting. Such developments can obviously have severe consequences for the price formation 
in the long-run because competition requires many market players and excess capacities.  
3.4  Environmental policy 
The discussion so far clearly shows the complexity of energy policy and, in particular, the 
problems and obstacles to establish a competitive electricity market. The report has, until now, 
focused on the discussion of the current situation of the electricity markets regarding the energy 
mix used for electricity generation and features which can potentially hamper the development 
of a fully competitive and open electricity market. These features, such as network capacity 
constraints, overcapacity in national markets and the ongoing concentration process on the 
generators as well as on the supplier levels were addressed in the Electricity Directives. During 
the implementation phase, which started in 1999, it became clear that the rules and regulations 
laid down in the Electricity Directive did not go far enough and the European Commission 
published an amended proposal in 2002
41. However, not all problems encountered during the 
implementation process have been equally addressed. It can probably be said there is still a lack 
of clarity how can the multiple objectives of EU energy policy and their simultaneous 
achievements be combined. The difficulty with the multiple objectives is discernible when the 
development of the electricity price is studied. The creation of an open energy market should 
increase efficiency by introducing competitive forces into the market leading to reduced prices.  
 
41 European Commission (2002c).  
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The use of market-based instruments for environmental policy 
The European Commission has, in the sixth environmental action programme, emphasised the 
necessity to internalise the external costs to the environment. A widespread agreement exists 
that, in particular, electricity prices do not cover the external costs arising during the generation 
and consumption process. The transposition of this policy requires the use of policy instruments 
in the form of market-based instruments, such as taxes, tradable emission permits or emissions 
trading. It is quite evident that the implementation of such measures will influence the price 
formation.
42  
The estimation of external costs of electricity generation is a very complex task and is tainted 
with difficulties. A first estimate of the range of external costs of electricity generation from 
different fuels can be found in Table 3.6.
43 
Table 3.6  Estimates of external costs (EURc/kWh at constant 1995 prices) and electricity prices (EURc/ 





























                   
Austria   -  -  1-3  -  2-3  0.1  -  7.8  12.5 
Belgium   4-15  -  1-2  0.5  -  -  -  6.3  12.4 
Denmark   4-7  -  2-3  -  1  -  0.05  7.6  16.7 
Finland   2-4  -  -  -  1  -  -  4.3  6.7 
France   7-10  8-11  2-4  0.3  1  1  -  5.5  10.6 
Germany   3-6  5-8  1-2  0.2  3  -  0.1-0.2  6.2  13.9 
Greece   5-8  3-5  1    0-1  1  0.2-0.3  4.0  5.1 
Ireland   6-8  -  -  -  -  -  -  4.9  6.6 
Italy   -  3-6  2-3  -  -  0.3  -  7.0  16.8 
Netherlands   3-4  -  1-2  0.7  0.5    -  5.4  14.6 
Portugal   4-7  -  1-2  -  1-2  0.2  -  4.7  9.1 
Spain   5-8  -  1-2  -  -  -  0.2  5.7  8.1 
Sweden   2-4  -  -  -  0.3  0.03  -  3.3  9.0 
UK   4-7  3-5  1-2  0.3  1  0-0.7  0.1-0.2  5.9  7.5 
 
Source: European Environment Agency (2002) p. 58 
 
The findings of this research project funded by the European Commission estimates the external 
costs of electricity generation representing around 1-2% of GDP in the EU
44. The evaluation 
clearly shows that the costs are fuel-and country-specific. They all have in common that full 
internalisation of external costs into the prices paid by the electricity consumer would bring 
dramatic price increases. The reason for such a policy is the current market failure because, in 
the price formation, it considers only the economic / financial and not the social costs, i.e. the 
economic costs as well as the external costs. Such price increases would be dramatic in the 
 
42
 See for example: Department of Trade and Industry (2003). 
43
 See for further information: European Commission (1999c). 
44 
European Commission, (2001e). The external costs of global warming are not included in these estimates.  
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countries relying on coal and oil as the main inputs for electricity generation. Germany, Spain, 
Italy and the UK, would be in particular affected with steep rising electricity prices in the case 
of full internalisation as the external costs of using coal and lignite have been in the same range 
as industrial electricity prices (see Table 3.6). The external costs of renewables are almost 
negligible compared to the costs relating to coal and oil.  
The comparison of end-user prices and prices excluding any taxes in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 shows 
many EU member states making use of some form of fiscal instruments. The main focus lies on 
the third column because the data presented can be interpreted as a form of environmental and / 
or energy taxation aiming to internalise external costs. However, it would go beyond the scope 
of this report to analyse in detail whether the underlying rationale for implementing these taxes 
were environmental considerations or other reasons such as a policy tool to generate revenues.  
Probably the most interesting information provided in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 is the last column that 
illustrates the share of all taxes as a percentage of the end-user price. The main conclusions are: 
·  this share is generally higher for households than for industries; i.e. household consumption of 
electricity is relatively and absolutely higher taxed than industrial consumption; 
·  the prices without taxes are higher for households than for industries in EU member states. This 
can be attributed to the difference in transmission and distribution costs; 
·  big differences exist in the size of the taxes between the EU member states as well as between 
the different users in the same country; 
·  the share of taxes paid by households is highest in Denmark and lowest in Portugal and in the 
UK, for example 54% of the price paid by a Danish household is allocated to the governmental 
budget;  
·  electricity purchased by households is subject to some form of energy taxation in the majority 
of EU member states with the exception of Greece, Ireland and the UK;  
·  the contribution of taxes paid by industrial users is highest in Denmark (41%) and lowest in 
Portugal (5%); 
·  energy taxation is less widespread for industry than for households.   
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Table 3.7  Electricity prices for households in European countries (in EUR/MWh: situation January 2002) 
   Price without   Taxes  VAT  End-user   Taxes in % 
  taxes      price  of end-user price 
           
Austria   109.7  18.7  25.7  154.1  29  (12) 
Belgium   141.7  1.5  30.1  173.3  26    (1)  
Denmark   120.4  89.6  52.5  262.5  54  (34) 
Finland   91.6  7.1  21.7  120.4  24    (6) 
France (Paris)  112.5  11.9  22.0  146.4  23    (8) 
Germany (western zone)  163.4  17.9  29.0  210.3  22    (9) 
Greece (Athens)  68.0  0.0  6.0  74.0  8    (0) 
Ireland (Dublin)  130.2  0.0  16.3  146.5  11    (0) 
Italy   75.5  10.6  8.6  94.7  20  (11) 
Luxembourg   155.7  7.1  9.8  172.6  10    (4) 
Netherlands   123.9  22.6  27.9  174.4  29  (13) 
Norway   177.3  11.7  45.3  234.3  24    (5) 
Portugal (Lisbon)  143.3  0.7  7.2  151.2  5    (0) 
Spain (Madrid)  109.9  5.6  18.5  134.0  18    (4) 
Sweden   112.9  20.5  35.2  168.6  33  (12) 
UK   146.6  0.0  7.3  153.9  5    (0) 
 
Note: prices for households with an annual consumption of 1,200 kWh – category Db; special regulations are applicable for Italian 
households belonging to this category. Share of taxes other than VAT in % of end user price in brackets. 
Source: Eurostat          
 
Table 3.8  Electricity prices for industries in European countries (in EUR/MWh: situation January 2002) 
 
Price without 
taxes  Taxes  VAT  End-user price 
Taxes in % of 
end-user price 
           
Belgium   87.9  0.1  18.5  106.5  17    (0) 
Denmark   63.9  6.8  38.3  109.0  41    (6) 
Finland   44.9  4.3  10.9  60.1  25    (7) 
France (Paris)  65.6  0.0  10.6  76.2  14    (0) 
Germany (western zone)  76.4  3.6  12.8  92.8  18    (4) 
Greece (Athens)  64.0  0.0  5.0  69.0  7    (0) 
Ireland (Dublin)  94.9  0.0  11.9  106.8  11    (0) 
Italy   82.1  23.6  10.6  116.3  29  (20)  
Luxembourg   70.4  6.3  4.6  81.3  13    (8)  
Norway   50.0  0.0  12.0  62.0  19    (0)  
Portugal (Lisbon)  72.6  0.0  3.6  76.2  5    (0) 
Spain (Madrid)  57.0  2.9  9.6  69.5  18   (4)  
Sweden   34.6  0.0  8.6  43.2  20   (0) 
UK   68.1  3.5  12.5  84.1  19   (4)  
 
Note: prices for industrial users of an annual consumption 1,250,000 kWh with a maximum demand 500 kW (category Id) – no data 
available for Austria and the Netherlands. Share of taxes other than VAT in % of end user price in brackets. 
Source: Eurostat         
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It is not surprising that the major share of total tax revenues accrued by the government are 
generally VAT revenues levied on the sale of a unit of electricity. However, during the recent 
years the contribution of other taxes (i.e. environmental and /or energy taxes) levied on the use 
of electricity has increased in EU member states. These policies are a consequence of 
environmental challenges countries are facing and they are often part of more general fiscal 
restructuring policies such as the implementation of revenue-neutral green tax reform.
45  
Policies promoting the use of renewables  
Apart from these fiscal policies attempting to internalise the external costs, other environmental 
policy initiatives, having in common their direct influence on the creation of a competitive 
energy market, are becoming more widespread. The common objective of these policies is the 
promotion of the use of renewables in the energy mix in EU member states. This development 
illustrates that environmental concern and protection is on the political agenda. The 
implementation of these policies can, however, lead to possible conflicts between 
environmental and economic considerations/objectives:  
·  to internalise external costs - via taxes - and to promote the use of renewable - via special 
support schemes - with a consequence of increasing electricity prices (environmental 
considerations); 
·  to increase efficiency by introducing competitive market conditions with the aim of converging 
the electricity prices between EU member states and to reduce electricity prices because the 
currently electricity prices are causing ‘unacceptable, and unnecessary, distortions in the 
competitive conditions across the single market’
46. High electricity prices are also regularly 
described as competitive obstacle with respect to the main trading partners outside of the EU 
(economic considerations). 
 
Environmental concerns have become a crucial driving force of EU policies as it can be seen in 
the recently adopted or proposed initiatives of promoting the use of renewable, reducing overall 
energy use and with regard to the Kyoto Protocol; i.e. the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The application of environmental taxes can be perceived as part of the strategy of 
achieving a reduction in the overall energy use by increasing the price of energy products. 
Increases in prices should trigger behavioural changes and should simultaneously promote 
energy efficiency improvements, particularly, in the medium- to long-run. Furthermore, the use 
of economic instruments is advantageous in the dynamic context as they provide ongoing and 
continual incentives to reduce emission through cost-effective technologies. Apart from these 
market-based policies some other European policy initiatives that will affect the price formation 
and competition on energy markets have started. These other policy initiatives are aiming to 
promote the widespread use of renewables in EU member states:  
 
45
 OECD (2001). 
46 
European Commission (1998).  
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·  In 1997, the EC adopted the ‘White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan, Energy 
for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy’ with the target of 12% contribution of renewable 
energy sources (RES) to total EU gross inland energy consumption by 2010. 
·  In 2001, the European Parliament adopted the Directive on the promotion of electricity from 
renewable energy sources (RES-E Directive). This Directive sets a target of 22% of total EU 
electricity production being generated by renewable energy sources for 2010. Indicative targets 
for each EU member states are also part of the Directive. 
·  In 2002, draft Directive on bio fuels aiming to increase the use of bio fuels in the EU has been 
proposed. 
The 2001 Directive on the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources will have 
severe consequences for the European energy market, particularly, for the electricity market and 
electricity prices. The increasing use of renewables in electricity generation (green electricity) 
obviously influences the price formation process since the generation prices of green electricity 
are still higher compared to conventional thermal and nuclear generation costs
47. Specific 
support programmes for the promotion of the use of renewables are in place in many member 
states
48 and are regularly funded through specific earmarked fiscal instruments. The situation in 
Germany is presented in Table 3.9 providing an example of different policy instruments and 
schemes in place.  
Table 3.9  Estimated average electricity bill of household (per month in EUR and in percentage of total 
electricity bill) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002 
         
Electricity bill – total per month        48.20      40.61    41.72     44.60 
VAT (16 %)  6.65 (14%)  5.60 (14%)  5.76 (14%)      6.15 (14%) 
Concession charge (1)   5.22 (11%)   5.22 (13%)  5.22 (13%)      5.22 (12%) 
CHP law (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz)          0.00          0.38   (1%)  0.59   (1%)      0.76   (2%) 
Renewable energy law (Erneuerbare-Energie- 
Gesetz, EEG)          0.28   (1%)  0.53   (2%)  0.63   (2%)      0.85   (2%) 
Electricity tax           2.25   (5%)  3.73   (9%)  4.47 (11%)      5.22 (12%) 
Electricity generation, transmission and distribution  33.80 (70%)  25.15 (62%)  25.05 (60%)    26.40 (59%) 
 
Note: Basis for calculation: Electricity consumption of 3,500 kWh per annum; (1) concession charge is regionally differentiated and the 
rates are set between 1.32 euro cent/kWh and 2.39 euro cent/kWh. 
Source: VDEW, www.vdew.de; report published on April 29, 2002. 
 
The table illustrates the development of different cost components between 1999 and 2002. The 
total monthly bill dropped, between 1999 and 2002, by around 10% as a result of the big fall in 
the electricity generation, transmission and distribution costs (22%). In contrast, the share of 
taxes and charges paid by electricity consumers on the total electricity bill increased both in 
 
47
 See for example Auer J. (2002) for a comparison of the specific generation costs for different technologies. 
48
 A detailed discussion of the different programmes and models used in EU member states can be found by Huber et al. 
(2001) and a detailed analysis of the Dutch situation by Energy Research Foundation (ECN) (2001). Considering the fast 
changing political situation with regard to such support schemes information presented in these reports could be out-of-date.  
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absolute and relative terms, i.e. from around 6% to 16%. The share of all cost components 
which cannot be assigned to the generation, transmission and distribution costs is still higher; it 
increased from 30% to around 41%. The contribution of taxes and charges are even higher in 
Austria where average bill of a consumers is composed of the costs of energy generation (22% 
of the final bill), transmission and distribution (41%) and taxes and charges (37%). It is also 
worthwhile having a closer look on the fiscal system funding the promotion of green electricity 
in Austria. The system consists of two components: electricity utilities have to pay green 
electricity from the generator at a price of 45 EUR/MWh (average ‘market’ price is around 25 
EUR/MWh). In addition, financial burden is also levied on the final consumer: households are 
paying a surcharge of 1.39 EUR/MWh and the energy-intensive industry a surcharge of 0.99 
EUR/MWh in 2003.  
Table 3.10 shows the current situation with regard to the share of electricity generated by 
renewable energy resources and the indicative targets for 2010 of the RES-E Directive. All 
member states have quite a long way to go to fulfil these targets affecting clearly the domestic 
electricity generation markets because the energy mix for generation of electricity will have to 
change. That will undoubtedly have some consequences for the electricity prices in the future as 
the electricity generation costs from renewable sources are still higher compared to 
conventional technology. 
Table 3.10  Electricity generation from renewable sources – current situation and indicative targets 
 
Electricity generated 
from renewables  
  
Share of electricity 
generated from 
renewables 
Target of electricity 
generated from 
renewables 
Electricity generated from 
renewables (estimated)  
  
  (TWh, 1997)  (%, 1997)  (%, 2010)  (TWh, 2010) 
         
Austria   39.05  70.0  78.1  55.16 
Belgium   0.86  1.1  6.0  6.30 
Denmark   3.21  8.7  29.0  12.88 
Finland   19.03  24.7  31.5  30.43 
France   66.00  15.0  21.0  112.92 
Germany   24.91  4.5  12.5  76.66 
Greece   3.94  8.6  20.1  14.57 
Ireland   0.84  3.6  13.2  4.46 
Italy   46.46  16.0  25.0  89.76 
Netherlands   3.45  3.5  9.0  11.94 
Luxembourg   0.14  2.1  5.7  0.45 
Portugal   14.30  38.5  39.0  24.19 
Spain   37.15  19.9  29.4  75.15 
Sweden   72.03  49.1  60.0  97.54 
UK   7.04  1.7  10.0  50.03 
EU  338.41  13.9  22.0  662.45 
 
Source: European Commission (2001f) and Huber et al. (2001) 
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Setting such indicative targets has to be identified as a political intervention into the energy 
market that is not necessarily in accordance with the ideal situation of full competition. There 
are a number of other political motivated interventions: several EU member states have passed 
laws to close nuclear power plants (for example: Belgium, Germany, and Sweden). One of the 
consequences of these policies will be that the merit order in the different countries will change. 
It can, therefore, be expected that the marginal plant during the average load period will have 
higher generation costs compared to the situation today because nuclear power plants are 
generally covering the base load in these countries. It is not possible to draw a definite 
conclusion. Many other factors are determining the choice of future investment, i.e. what types 
of conventional thermal will be built, in addition to the renewable generation plants, to satisfy 
expected growth in electricity demand, and to offset the reduction in capacity as a consequence 
of these nuclear closure programmes. The size of new investment programmes are further 
depending on the potential of energy / electricity savings measures and how much of this 
potential will actually be realised.  
Several forecasts done by different institutions, such as the European Commission, the 
International Energy Agency and the US Department of Energy, came to the conclusion that 
major new development of extending capacities will be investments into CCGT plants using 
natural gas. This will seriously affect the development of the natural gas market as well as the 
pricing regimes for natural gas.  
Furthermore, it can be expected that subsidy schemes, such as those mentioned in Table 3.10, 
will have to play a major role in the development of the promotion of green electricity. The 
types of strategies for promoting electricity generation from renewables are manifold. However, 
some of these schemes are offering very high amounts which can add up to 200 EUR/MWh in 
cases of support for PV.
49 Such a high support is more the exemption and the rates for other 
renewables are much lower. Other policies, as the one implemented in the UK, are also 
intervening into the electricity market. The, so called, renewables obligation in the UK requires 
that retailers of electricity have to cover a growing percentage of their supplies from renewable 
generation. If the retailers do not fulfil their ratio they have to compensate any shortfall by 
paying for an exemption certificate.  
An issue that has, so far, not attracted too much interest in this context is related to problems of 
availability and volatility of green electricity. A recent study
50 commissioned by the UK 
Government, Department of Trade & Industry, estimated that the system costs could increase to 
around £ 400 million per annum, if England and Wales would raise the targets for green 
electricity to 20% by 2020. The actual figures of the size of these system costs (which exclude 
all capital and operating costs of renewable electricity generation and the costs of connecting 
these new generation capacity to the transmission and distribution system) estimated in this 
report are not as important compared to the reasons why these system costs do occur. The 
 
49
 Huber et al (2001) 
50 
ILEX (2002).  
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unreliability of renewables in electricity generation is identified as the main reason, meaning 
that additional investments are needed in short-term balancing, and into additional thermal 
power stations to ensure security of supply. The problematic and complex issue around the 
short-term balancing mechanisms of renewables is a topic raising further questions about how 
governments promote and support renewables in electricity generation and how such schemes 
intervene and distort the market
51.  
Summary 
As discussed in Chapter 2.1, one of the rationales for introducing the Electricity Directive was 
the different price level between EU member states and with the main trading partners outside 
of the EU. The creation of an internal European energy market should remove such distortions 
by increasing efficiency. An implicit aim of creating competitive market is to lower electricity 
prices for the electricity users in EU member states.  
However, a discussion of energy politics must include other policy areas, such as environmental 
policy, because of possible synergies and / or discrepancies between them. The use of fiscal 
instruments for environmental policy issues is a widespread policy tool with quite distinct 
objectives. The focus of the study is to analyse the use of instruments to internalise external cost 
associated with electricity generation, and to support schemes promoting the use of renewables 
in electricity production. The former has to be characterised as a policy tool intervening on the 
market with the aim of improving the welfare of the citizens. In addition, this approach is 
completely in accordance with the general accepted polluter pays principle. The latter has to be 
assessed in the context of a range of different market intervention programmes all aiming to 
promote the use of renewables. It is worth noting that non-market based measures (in the form 
of regulations providing indicative targets for the use of renewable in the energy mix in EU 
member states) are combined with fiscal support schemes. These policies are insofar of 
relevance because they are opposed to the creation of competitive conditions.  
The significance of fiscal instruments has clearly been shown in the analysis considering that 
taxes (energy / environmental taxes and VAT) can account for up to 50% of the end-user price 
for households. The share of VAT is generally much higher than the share of environmental 
policy instruments in EU member states. However, some changes with regard to the latter 
policy tools will occur in 2004 following the political agreement reached by the EU Economics 




This problem is regularly mentioned in the context of NETA see: Helm D. (2002b) and Newbery D.M. (2002).  
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4  Cross-Country Analysis of Energy Markets and Prices 
4.1  Introduction 
As shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 some progress has been achieved in the process of creation 
Community-wide energy markets for electricity and gas. Expectations are rather high providing 
the process should increase efficiency thus leading to a greater competition amongst existing 
market players and between the incumbents and new market players. The regulation for new 
entry, laid down in the Electricity Directive stipulates that ‘new entry must be permitted under 
the transparent, objective and non-discriminatory terms of an authorisation procedure. The 
Directives create thus fundamental conditions for supply-side competition between incumbent 
operators as well as between incumbents and new market entrants. … The existing monopolistic 
supply situation does not evolve overnight into a competitive market structure’.
52  
Another implicit aim of the European energy policy is to start a process of converging national 
energy prices. The figures below show the development of retail prices (nominal prices without 




An uniform development of retail prices cannot be established during this period. Some of these 
findings are noteworthy: a trend of reducing the prices for the industrial sector is discernible in 
Germany which is in slight contrast to the evolution in Italy. The retail prices before tax are the 
lowest in Sweden irrespectable of the different user categories. Based on these developments it 
is unfeasible to conclude whether the aim of more congruence between electricity prices has 
been achieved. It should be noted that the policies transposing the Electricity Directive into the 
national legal systems are in place for only three years in many EU member states. Therefore, it 
will take some time before any meaningful conclusions can be drawn. It is, indeed, not 
surprising to find different developments of electricity retail prices considering the potential 
economical, technical and political obstacles in the context of creating a competitive market. 
The actual causes can be manifold and are studied in detailed analysis of national electricity 
markets below.  End user prices in some EU member states are presented in the Figures 4.4 – 
4.6. Uniform trend in the end-user prices can, again, not be reported. Probably the most 
irritating development occurred in Italy where energy-intensive users (category Ig) have faced 
an increase of 30% in the current prices between January 1999 and July 2002 compared to a 
decrease of 9% for industrial users (category Ib) consuming and of 8% for households. This 
development is not the result of introducing any fiscal measures. An increase in the end-user 
 
52
 Albers M. (2001) p. 7. 
53
 Only the price developments in some countries are shown in these figures. The full tables covering all 15 EU member 
states can be found in the annexes. The source of these figures is Eurostat’s half-yearly publication ‘Statistics in Focus – 
Theme 8 - Energy and Environment’ – for further information: see the website of Eurostat at: 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/   
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prices for households, quite often resulting from the introduction of fiscal measures, can be 
found in several countries shown in Figure 4.6.  
Figure 4.1  Electricity retail price before taxes (current prices EUR/MWh) – Eurostat category Ig – 
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Figure 4.2  Electricity retail price before taxes (current prices EUR/MWh) – Eurostat category Ib – 
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Source: Eurostat and European Commission (2002a).  
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Figure 4.3  Electricity retail price before taxes (current prices EUR/MWh) – Eurostat category Dc – 
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Source: Eurostat and European Commission (2002a) 
 
Figure 4.4  Electricity end-user prices including all taxes (current prices EUR/MWh) – Eurostat category Ig – 
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Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 4.5  Electricity end-user prices including all taxes (current prices EUR/MWh) – Eurostat category Ib – 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 4.6  Electricity end-user prices including all taxes (current prices EUR/MWh) – Eurostat category Dc – 
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Source: Eurostat.  
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The rationale for analysing national electricity markets is to identify country-specific features 
which can hinder the creation of competitive market structures and influence the price 
formation. However, a caveat has to be made before the analysis of some national markets is 
done, that the analysis will be far from exhaustive. The main focus is directed to study the 
electricity generation mix and to learn more about regulatory systems influencing wholesale 
prices, particularly, in Spain and Italy. Further issues, such as the current reserve margins in 
national electricity markets, current patterns in electricity trade and the question of the level of 
concentration, will also be addressed. 
4.2  The Nordic/Scandinavian electricity market 
4.2.1  Introduction 
The Nordic countries started to reform their electricity markets in the early 1990s, before the 
Electricity Directive was adopted. The exception was Denmark, which started the reform 
process in 1999. Owing to some country-specific characteristics, the development in the four 
Nordic countries should be discussed separately. One of the main differences is presented in 
Table 4.1. Before the reform process begun the single, vertically integrated generation and 
transmission companies dominated the national markets and ‘market power was a salient 
feature of the Nordic power market’.
54  
Table 4.1  Electrical energy generated in the Nordic countries in 2001 (in percentage) 
  Denmark   Finland   Norway   Sweden   Nordic countries 
           
Hydro    18  99  50  55 
Wind  11      0  1 
Nuclear    31    44  24 
Conventional thermal  89  51  1  6  20 
- bio fuels, peat, etc  5  20    2  5 
- coal  48  15    1  8 
- gas  25  13  0  1  5 
- oil  1  2    2  1 
- others  9  1  0  0  1 
     
Source: Swedish Energy Agency (2002)     
 
4.2.2  The Norwegian electricity market  
Norway was, after England and Wales, the second European country opening its electricity 
market to competition in 1991. In 1995 all electricity users had the freedom to choose their 
electricity supplier. Power generation is almost completely based on hydropower (see Table 
3.3) which is interesting knowing that Norway is one of the biggest natural gas producers in the 
 
54 Bergman L. (2001) p. 1.  
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world. The Norwegian Government is planning to extend the use of renewables in the coming 
years partly based on an ambitious environmental policy. Discussions about the expansion of 
gas-fired power generation are also underway. The biggest problem Norway is facing in terms 
of electricity generation is the complete hydro-dependency and the high volatility of the 
wholesale price coming as a consequence of the weather dependency. This problem is reduced 
ever since the Nordic countries established a common electricity exchange Nordic Power 
Exchange, also known as Nord Pool, which is the most liquid trading place for electricity in 
Europe. Liquid and transparent trading places for electricity is a major component for the 
proper functioning of competition in the electricity industry.
55 
4.2.3  The Swedish electricity market 
The structure of the Swedish electricity market differs from the Norwegian market. In 2001, the 
majority of electricity was generated in hydro power plants, as in Norway, but it accounted only 
for 50% of total generated electricity (see Table 4.1). The major difference is that nuclear power 
in Sweden accounted for 44%, while the remaining 6% are generated in fossil- or bio fuel-fired 
plants. The Swedish power sector does not face the big problem of hydro/weather dependency, 
as it is the case in Norway. Nevertheless this issue is of some concern, in particular, with 
respect to the nuclear closure programme. 
 
The Swedish electricity market was reformed in 1996 by introducing competition in trading and 
generation of electricity. However, the transmission and distribution have not been opened and 
are characterised as a ‘regulated monopoly’.
56 In 1997, the Swedish Parliament adopted the 
Nuclear Power Phase-out Act and the first nuclear power plant has been shut in November 
1999. A further shut down of a plant is expected to be ‘at the end of 2003 at the latest, provided 
that the loss of generation capacity can be compensated by reduced electricity consumption and 
new generation capacity. The Government has considered the matter on two occasions, but then 
concludes that the conditions were not met’.
57 A possible risk of power shortage was tackled by 
the Swedish Government by entrusting Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish grid utility, ‘with the 
task of safeguarding electricity generation capacity during very cold weather. This has been 
done by purchasing reserve power capacity. The assignment resulted in additional power 
generation capacity consisting of previously decommissioned power generation plants and 
companies prepared to reduce their power consumption voluntarily. The procurement of reserve 




See for further information: Green R. (2001). 
56
 Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 2. 
57
 Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 17. 
58 
Swedish Energy Agency (2002) pp. 2-3.  
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4.2.4  The Finnish electricity market 
The reform of the Finnish electricity market started in 1995, with the market completely opened 
to competition in 1998. The Finnish generation mix is based on conventional thermal power 
(accounted for 51% in 2001), nuclear power (31%) and hydro power (18%). Finland was, 
throughout the last years, an importer of electricity. Combined with growing electricity demand 
for electricity the Finnish Government proposed in January 2002 to build a nuclear power 
plants, which was approved by the Parliament in May 2002. 
4.2.5  The Danish electricity market 
The Danish electricity sector heavily relies on coal-fired and gas-fired thermal power plants; the 
former accounted for 48% and the latter for 25% in 2001. This situation is in sharp contrast to 
the mix in the other Nordic countries. A further difference is the big share of renewables in the 
generation mix; wind power accounted for 11%. The long-term energy plan of the Danish 
Government is to further promote the share of renewables, in particular the use of bio fuels, 
straw and wood chips. The conversion of bio fuel-fired thermal power plants into combined 
heat and power plants is also a component of this energy plan.  
4.2.6  Summary – the Nordic region 
With the exception of Denmark all countries in the Nordic region have in common that a large 
proportion of electricity is generated from renewable energy sources. However, this is not 
crucial when the Nordic region is analysed as a whole (see the last column in Table 4.1) 
because the electricity markets in these four countries became increasingly integrated with the 
opening of the electricity wholesale pool Nordic Power Exchange (Nord Pool). This implies 
that developments of the national markets cannot be analysed in isolation considering that Nord 
Pool is the most liquid market by trading around 29% of total electricity generation on the 
physical market (spot market) in 2001. Electricity is also traded on a financial market for a 
period of up to four years (forward market) at Nord Pool.
59 
 
Nord Pool is currently the common marketplace for electricity trade in the four countries and 
trading tariffs between the countries have been abolished. All markets have been fully 
deregulated; i.e. transmission and distribution activities which are seen as natural monopolies 
are separated from generation and supply, regulated third-party access (rTPA) to the 
transmission and distribution network, and competition in generation and supply (retail 
services) is guaranteed. The tariffs of transmission and distribution services as well as the short 
term stability are regulated in each country separately thus guaranteeing that the overall control 
of the system remains under national responsibility. Free choice of selecting suppliers is fully 
established in Finland, Norway and Sweden but, so far, not in Denmark where only 35% of the 
market is declared open (see Table 2.1) although it is planned to be opened to all Danish 
 
59 See for further information about Nord Pool: www.nordpool.com and Swedish Energy Agency (2002).  
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electricity users during 2003. The general transposition of the requirements of the Electricity 
Directives is rather advanced considering that the European Commission did not identify too 
many obstacles concerning the effective opening and creating competitive conditions compared 
to the situation in other member states (see Table 2.1 and EC 2001a).  





























                           
1999  16.5  14.8  12.6  10.7  11.5  10.1  8.3  13.3  15.8  16.1  15.0  16.9  13.4 
2000  16.2  12.9  11.8  12.8  9.5  10.4  6.4  9.8  14.2  15.4  16.8  16.9  12.4 
2001  20.5  27.1  25.9  26.5  24.1  25.3  22.6  21.4  20.9  19.1  21.4  23.6  22.3 
2002  24.5  20.3  18.6  17.4  15.3  16.4  15.7  20.3  24.7  31.3  43.2  74.4  30.2 
               
Source: Elspot monthly prices at www.nordpool.com               
 
The development of the spot market during the period between 1999 and 2002 shows an 
increasing trend in electricity prices. During the last two months in 2002, the highest pool prices 
were reached with 74.4 EUR/MWh (43.2 EUR/MWh) in December (November) 2002 
compared to previous highest of 39.8 EUR/MWh in September 1996. The average price was 
still above 70 EUR/MWh in January 2003. One of the reasons was the very low rain fall; the 
lowest rain fall for the last 70 years is reported for the period between August and November 
2002 for Norway.  
Table 4.3  Spot market on Nord Pool for different areas in 2002 (EUR/MWh) 
Month  Oslo   Sweden   Finland   DK-West  DK-East  System 
             
January  24.23  24.89  24.91  23.49  27.14  24.53 
February  20.25  20.40  20.41  20.12  20.45  20.30 
March  18.61  18.62  18.62  18.96  18.66  18.60 
April  17.39  17.39  17.39  22.01  22.39  17.39 
May  15.05  15.76  15.85  18.06  16.01  15.27 
June  14.66  19.83  19.93  22.88  20.22  16.43 
July  14.59  17.00  18.39  19.44  18.98  15.66 
August  19.43  22.52  22.76  23.61  24.77  20.27 
September  24.15  25.82  25.81  28.72  26.67  24.65 
October  31.29  31.63  31.54  29.68  31.70  31.34 
November  43.14  43.25  43.25  35.85  43.25  43.22 
December  75.23  73.42  67.68  42.50  71.91  74.43 
Annual   26.57  27.62  27.28  25.47  28.59  26.91 
     
Source: Elspot monthly prices at www.nordpool.com     
 
A special feature of the Nord Pool electricity exchange is the creation of so-called notification 
areas, which are of crucial importance in the case of network limitations. Sweden and Finland is 
each one such notification area, Denmark is split in two and Norway consists of several such  
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notification areas. In the case of network limitations a price mechanism is applied to regulate 
the flow of power. In the area with existing surplus of electricity the price will be reduced, 
while the price increased in the shortfall area until the transmission requirement matches the 
capacity limit. Table 4.3 presents the development of the spot market for the main notification 
areas. 
 
Electricity retail prices in the Scandinavian countries have been quite low compared to the 
situation in other EU member states (see Figures 4.1 – 4.3 and the tables in the annexes). This is 
not surprising and is based on the fact that the Nordic generation market is established on low 
marginal cost generation capacities of hydro and nuclear. These generation capacities are used 
for base load. A potential increase in generation capacity will probably be based on 
conventional thermal plants with higher marginal costs and on renewables which could lead to 
an increase in retail prices.  
Table 4.4  Largest electricity generators in the Nordic countries in 2001 
Generator 
Energy generated in 2001 
(in TWh) 
Share on national market 
(in %) 
Share in Nordic countries 
(in %) 
       
Sweden   157.8                                             41        
  Vattenfall   76.6  49  20 
  Sydkraft  32.7  21  8  
Norway   121.9                                             31 
  Statkraft  33.3  27  9  
  Norsk Hydro  9.8  8                                             3 
Finland   71.6                                             18 
  Fortum  40.4  56  10  
  Pohjolan Voima Oy  15.9  22                                             4 
Denmark   36.0                                               9 
  Elsam  16.1  45                                             4 
  Energy E2  11.8  33                                             3 
Largest Nordic generators  236.6                                             61 
Total electricity generated  387.8      
 
Source: Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 40 
 
An area causing difficulties in creating a competitive electricity market is the existence of 
operators with dominant market shares as documented by the European Commission in the 
second benchmarking report. As a consequence of integration of the four national markets a 
slightly different approach has to be applied for this analysis. The largest Nordic electricity 
generators, by the share of their national and Nordic market, are presented in Table 4.4. This 
illustrates that the electricity generation is largely concentrated with a few companies in 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland but not in Norway.  This picture of high concentration slightly 
changes when the Nordic market is analysed as a whole. The biggest generator, the Swedish 
Vattenfall, has a share of 20% while the next two biggest of 10% and 9%. This statement has to  
  54 
be taken with some care because of the regionalisation of electricity markets, as it is the case in 
the Nordic region. For example, Sydkraft, the second biggest generator in Sweden, is owned by 
the German E.ON (a stake of 55%) and by the Norwegian Statkraft (44%). Furthermore, the 
Swedish Vattenfall is the fifth largest operator in Europe and is an important player on the 
Finnish market  (see also Table 4.4). Therefore, a simple calculation of national market shares 
does not necessarily say anything about market power as it was already discussed above. 
Furthermore, market power, which can impede competition on the electricity markets, does not 
only exist on the generator level but also on the supply/retail level. It can, additionally, be 
present as a combination between these two levels of the electricity chain as it can be observed 
in the Nordic region: ‘The three big companies Vattenfall, Fortrum/Birka Energi and Sydkraft 
also dominate on the electricity trading market. The three together account for around 70% of 
sales to end customers’
60.  
 




‘that an electricity market with vertical separation between generation and transmission can 
work without supply interruptions; “the lights did not go out”. Moreover the experience 
suggests that competition, and in particular retail competition, can lead to lower prices and 
higher productivity in the electricity supply industry. …. The overall evaluation of the electricity 
market reforms in the Nordic countries is quite positive. The benefits of increased competition 
are obvious, and few problems have emerged. However, the markets were deregulated and 
integrated in a situation with considerable overcapacity both in generation and transmission. 
Thus there have been few problems related to congestion management and the availability of 
reserve capacity’.  
 
These overall positive comments regarding the creation of a competitive Nordic electricity 
market are supported by the result of the study ‘Konkurrensen pa elmarknaden’ (Competition 
on the electricity market) commissioned by the Swedish Government. The study reports that: 
‘there are risks of ineffective competition, although there is no evidence that companies use 
their market power to further their own ends. The opinion of the study is that competition 
performs relatively well’.
62 Furthermore, the study sums up that ‘no evidence could be found to 
indicate that prices on the end customer market have been manipulated’.
63 The overall 
conclusion is that competition is functioning quite satisfactory. However, the market has to be 
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 Bergman L. (2001) p. 10. 
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Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 41. 
63 
Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 42.  
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critically studied in the future because of the accusation ‘that the differences between purchase 
price and sale price have increased during last year’.
64  
Johnsen (2003) comes to a similar conclusion analysing the Norwegian electricity market: 
‘While there are no clear signs of market power in the Norwegian market today, increased 
concentration may lead to higher prices in the future. Dominant generators may apply market 
power in various ways’. 
4.3  The UK electricity market 
The UK electricity market is structured differently. Distinction should be made between the 
markets in England and Wales and the market in Scotland. While the former has undergone a 
big transformation starting in the 1990s, the latter has not experienced such a process. 
Furthermore, the Scottish market remains regulated meaning that the wholesale prices of 
electricity are administered by using the price development in England as a benchmark.  
The generation mix in terms of generated output is different from the situation in the three 
northern countries of the Nordic regions. In 2000/01, gas fired generation (CCGT) accounted 
for 40% of total output, coal and oil for 30%, nuclear for 22% and imports for around 8% (see 
Table 4.5). The generation mix is similar to the situation in Denmark with thermal convention 
contributing around 70% in England and Wales compared to 80% in Denmark.  
Table 4.5  Generation Output by Fuel Type in EU Member States (in %) 
  UK   Germany (2000)  Spain   Italy   Netherlands (1999) 
           
  (2000/01)    (2000)  (2000)   
           
Nuclear  22  34  30    5 
Hard coal and lignite  52  38    25 
Coal & oil  30      9   
Oil          8 
Oil, gas & others  9  5  37   
Gas  40      2  56 
Hydro    5  14  17   
Cog. & Renewables    13  20  6 
Imports  8      15   
 
Source: Morgan Stanley Equity Research (2002). 
 
Interesting enough is the fact that the huge increase in gas generation capacity – from a market 
share close to zero in the early 1990s - happened during the last 10 years thus displacing coal 




 Swedish Energy Agency (2002) p. 42.  
  56 
The liberalisation process started in the UK with the electricity industry privatisation in 1990. 
During the privatisation process the UK Government created a very small number of companies 
dominating the generation market. Two of these generators, Powergen and National Power, 
were able to influence the price setting in the English Pool (wholesale market) until the mid of 
the 1990s although new players entered the market investing in new gas fired generation and 
increased imports from France. The situation changed when ‘the regulator adopted a highly 
interventionist approach – initially obliging the two companies to set prices not exceeding a 
specific level for two years, then forcing the companies to divest themselves of a significant 
proportion of their capacity on two occasions, and finally replacing the Pool with New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). The original structural decision to create only a 
small number of generating companies at privatisation took over a decade to put right. The 
England and Wales wholesale generation market is now, at last, exhibiting conditions 
representative of a competitive market – innovative contracting, price transparency and falling 
prices’.
65 
Some of the driving forces behind this development are the occurrence of new entrants 
investing mainly into CCGT generation technology, strong regulatory interventions and the 
changes in the market rules by moving away from the centrally administered Pool System to 
NETA in 2001. This new trading system holds more features associated with the idea of a more 
normal commodity trading market than the previous Pool System. However, the share of 
electricity traded through this balancing system is only around 3% which is much lower 
compared to the situation in the Nordic countries. 
 
As a consequence of these policies an increase in competition between generators took place 
and, accompanied with the increase in gas-fired generation capacity, led to an oversupply of 
electricity and to a sharp reduction in the wholesale price for electricity. The result of these 
developments - oversupply of electricity followed by a sharp drop in wholesale prices as a 
consequence of NETA - was the mothballing of some capacities and the financial crises of 
many generators, such as the nuclear electricity generator British Energy (September 2002).  
The UK generation and supply market is highly fragmented compared to the situation in other 
EU member states where no generator has a market share of more than 15%. This development 
is insofar significant implying that no participant has market power mothballing further capacity 
with the aim of increasing the wholesale prices. Such situation is in strict contrast to the 
development on the German electricity market discussed below. Future investments in CCGT 
plants are planned thus implying that the evolution of the gas price will have considerable 
influence of the wholesale electricity price in the medium- to long-term. 
 
UK electricity consumers have enjoyed a fall in electricity retail prices during the last years (see 
Table 2.3). Slightly different results can be found studying the end-user prices, in particular for 
 
65 Morrison M.B. (2002) p. 4.  
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private households, as they have been almost stable in nominal terms during the last four years. 
Interesting to mention are the findings of a report published by the National Audit Office 
(NAO) in January 2001 arguing that around 80% of the savings in UK electricity bills are the 
consequence of regulatory price controls rather than increased competition in the electricity 
generator and supply sectors. 
4.4  The German electricity market 
The generation mix of the German electricity market shows some similarities to the UK market 
considering that the major share of electricity is generated in thermal convention with a heavy 
dependency on lignite (27%) and hard coal (25%) in 2000 (see Table 4.5). One of the reasons 
for such high share is certainly the German Government’s promotion of coal and lignite use in 
the electricity generation. It is also worthy noting that the Electricity Directive indirectly 
supports such a policy by enabling member states to give some sort of priority for using 
indigenous primary energy sources up to a limit of 15% in the generation of electricity. Nuclear 
power accounts for 34% of electricity generated, hydro power for 5% and gas, oil and others for 
the remaining 5%.  
 
The future generation mix is directly influenced by political decisions. The financial support for 
the domestic coal industry will further be reduced over the coming years almost certainly 
influencing the use of coal in electricity generation. Additionally, the nuclear closure 
programme, which foresees the closure of all nuclear power plants during the period from 2002 
until 2022, will affect the electricity generation. Considering the long-term facet of the 
programme, this policy will not, on the short-run, lead to any severe consequences.  
Electricity trading in Germany has a shorter history compared to the UK and the Nordic 
countries. Trading began in 2000 on two different exchange places at the European Energy 
Exchange in Frankfurt and at the Leipzig Power Exchange. Both exchanges agreed to merge 
during 2002. Table 4.6 shows the development of the spot prices since the start of the electricity 
trade in Germany. The high volatility in spot prices as seen at the Nordic Power Exchange 
(shown in Table 4.3) have not occurred in Germany.  





























                           
2000              14.6  15.7  20.8  18.2  22.2  42.6  22.4 
2001  23.0  22.7  21.4  23.4  21.0  20.5  19.2  20.3  22.6  22.5  29.6  42.6  24.8 
2002  31.7  19.0  21.1  20.2  17.7  21.2  29.7  19.8  27.9  23.8  19.7  23.7  22.9 
                     
Source: www.eex.de                     
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Quite a high concentration of electricity generators can be found on the German market 
compared to the conditions prevailing at the UK electricity market. The two biggest operators, 
existing in this form only since 2000,
66  have the shares of installed capacity of around 30% 
(RWE) respectively 24% (E.ON), with Vattenfall following with a share of 16% and EnBW 
with 10%.  
At the start of electricity trading in the mid of 2000, spot prices have been around 15 
EUR/MWh indicating that they were close to the short-run marginal costs. This development 
can be tracked back to the increase in price competition between market players following the 
start of the deregulation process, and as a consequence of the oversupply of electricity at that 
time.  
 
One of the outcomes of the above mentioned mergers was the announcement of a capacity 
closure programmes by the two biggest market players of almost 10 GW capacity compared to 
the national generation capacity of around 106 GW. That resulted in an increase of the spot 
prices, particularly in the second half of 2001 (see Table 4.6). The trend of retail prices 
reduction has also stopped (see Figures IV.1-3). The German experience corresponds to the 
theoretical derived findings that strategic behaviour of the dominant market players can 
influence the electricity market and the price development, in particular, when there is excess 
capacity and the dominant player owns the mid-merit power plant.  
A further difference is a higher rate of interconnection capacity of Germany as compared to the 
UK (see Table A.1). Sufficient interconnection capacity has to be seen as a necessary 
prerequisite for a Community-wide electricity market providing consumers with a wider choice 
of suppliers. 
4.5  The Spanish electricity market 
The liberalisation process in Spain started already in 1997, with market opening from January 1, 
1998. The complete opening of the market has not been achieved yet, but is planned for 2003 
(see Table 2.1). Generation mix in Spain is similar to Germany: nuclear power plants account 
for 30% of total electricity generated in 2000 while hard coal accounts for the biggest share, i.e. 
38%. Hydroelectric accounts for 14%, cogeneration / renewables for 13% and the remaining 
output is generated in oil and gas power plants (Table 4.5). One of the main characteristics of 
the Spanish market is its location, at the fringe of the EU, having some implications regarding 
the interconnection capacity. The total import capacity is around 5% of total installed capacity, 
which is very low compared with EU member states. An exception is the UK with an import 
capacity in the same range.  
 
66 The two companies Veba and Viag merged, creating E.on in June 2000. The merger of RWE and VEW was finalised in 
July 2000 and the new company is called RWE.  
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The relevance of cross-border trade of electricity in the context of establishing a competitive 
European electricity market has been addressed on several occasions. For example, the 
European Commission concluded in the second benchmarking report that the figure of only 8% 
of total electricity consumption traded between EU member states in 2000 ‘leaves the EU far 
from a real, competitive internal market’.
67 The European Commission proposes a target of 
interconnection capacity of at least 10% of installed capacity. The European Council in 
Barcelona agreed to this target which should be achieved by 2005.  
Spain was one of the first EU member states that established a standardised wholesale market 
for electricity, OMEL, in 1998
68. Since then, the generation prices are established via a pool, i.e. 
the marginal plant determines the system price. Prior to this date, the Spanish market was 
completely regulated and the generation price was around 45 EUR/MWh. Compared to this 
administered price, the past spot market prices are quite low. A trend of slightly increasing spot 
prices can be observed on the Spanish power exchange.  
 
The Spanish OMEL, similar to the electricity exchanges in Germany (EEX), in Scandinavia 
(Nord Pool) and in the Netherlands (APX) is a voluntary market which, in addition has a 
bilateral contract market
69. The former type of market, generally in competition with the 
bilateral contract market, is different from an obligatory power pool on which all generated 
electricity is traded, as it was the case in the UK before NETA, a voluntary scheme, was 
implemented. However, the Spanish market, in theory a voluntary power exchange, can 
practically be classified as a pool considering that 90% of electricity is traded.  
 
In spite of this, a type of administrative regulation survived in the Spanish electricity market 
implicating a mandatory fixed capacity and an ancillary service payment of around 6 
EUR/MWh closely connected to the issue of stranded cost
70. This administrative regulation, in 
place for some time, known as ‘Cost of Transit to Competition (CTC)’ was introduced with the 
aim of incumbents recovering old investment costs that cannot be recovered under free market 
conditions. Such a policy approach affects the development of the pool price as it leads to an 
implicit price cap of 39 EUR/MWh. Any pool price above this ceiling will reduce the individual 
generators CTC allowance, meaning that the generators cannot receive more than 39 
EUR/MWh for generated electricity. In cases where the pool price is above this cap the 
regulator receives the excess revenue. Such a policy seriously distorts price competition. 
Important to mention is that only incumbents are eligible for receiving CTCs. The actual effect 
of this policy is that in the case of a pool price of 35 EUR/MWh the incumbents will receive a 




European Commission (2002a) p. 22. 
68 
see for further information www.omel.es. 
69
 Energy Research Foundation (ECN) (2002). 
70
 See for further information regarding stranded costs: European Commission (2000)  
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Spain is, together with Germany, France and the UK, the only EU member state still producing 
coal. The coal industry in Spain, Germany and France is not competitive and crucially depends 
on public aid. The Spanish regulatory framework laid down a support instrument of providing 
generators using domestic coal with a subsidy of around 6 EUR/MWh. Furthermore, the 
Spanish generator market is highly concentrated by the two incumbents; i.e. Endesa with a 
market share of 39% of installed capacity and Iberdrola with 29%.  
 
High degree of market concentration and a number of other administrative and regulatory 
conditions, such as the issue stranded costs via the CTC mechanism, will affect the future 
development of electricity prices in the totally liberalised Spanish electricity market of 2003 as 
pronounced by the Spanish Government. Every domestic consumer will have the freedom of 
choosing energy supplier. However, the new electricity pricing rules that came into force at the 
beginning of 2003 are not necessarily in accordance with the idea of a competitive market due 
to the control of future increase in prices. In January 2003, it has been announced that Spanish 
electricity price will rise by an average of 1.69 percent next year and that the prices can only 
rise by a maximum of 2 percent a year in the period 2003 to 2010
71.  
 
Recent developments do not reveal that the situation regarding the high concentration will 
change dramatically, particularly in the light of quite limited number of new entrants during the 
recent years. Additionally, the discussed expansion of the Spanish market by including the 
Portuguese and forming an Iberian market would not alter the current situation and the two 
companies would remain the dominant players
72 partly because of the missing interconnection 
capacity and the political regulation of allocating capacities to market players.  
It is certainly correct to argue that the Spanish electricity market is far from being a competitive 
one. All these regulatory interventions are against the idea of establishing a level playing field 
between the different actors.  
 
71
 World Environmental News (2003). 
72 
Morrison M.B. (2002).  
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4.6  The Italian electricity market 
The Italian electricity market shows some interesting features being one of the least open 
markets within the EU in terms of eligible customer, i.e. it is expected that the number of 
eligible customers free to choose their supplier will raise to two thirds in 2003 (also compare 
Table 2.1). This is not the only aspect that makes the Italian market different from the others 
studied in this report. For example, Italy is still in the process of establishing a competitive 
generation market by creating the national electricity exchange, the Italian pool, which has been 
approved by the Italian legislature already in 1999.
73 As it can be observed in other EU member 
states, the formation of an electricity exchange is essential for the set up of a competitive, 
transparent and flexible electricity market. This is essential in the Italian case, as it would 
replace the current practice of regulating electricity prices, and only allowing that a fall in the 
high electricity prices can be anticipated. 
 
Regulated electricity prices are based on two components: the first one is a fixed component 
that was 20.5 EUR/MWh in 2001 and 2002 compared to 25.6 EUR/MWh in 2000. The second, 
variable component is linked (indexed) to the development of prices of a basket of other energy 
fuels and on a year average was around 40 EUR/MWh leading to an average price of 60 
EUR/MWh for the year 2002. The variable component closely oscillated around the 
international fuel price trends. Compared to the spot prices set at the electricity exchanges in 
EU member states this price is very high (as shown above). It is, therefore, of no surprise that 
the retail prices in Italy are by far the highest in the EU (see Figure 4.1-3) and among the 




Another feature of the Italian market worthwhile mentioning while reviewing the differences 
between EU member states: Italy heavily relies on oil- and gas-fired power plants and their 
contribution to the total output is around 37%. Hydropower makes a sizeable contribution 
(17%) and imports account for 15%. Imports are insofar of interest –for the formation of the 
electricity price - because of current generation mix in France and Switzerland, countries where 
the majority of Italian electricity imports originate. France and Switzerland are countries with 
relatively low generation costs, owing mainly to nuclear technology in France and hydropower 
in Switzerland. The main reason for not importing more electricity into Italy, considering an 
 
73 The opening of the Italian electricity exchange was postponed several times during the last years. According to Italian 
sources it was expected that the exchange should have been opened in October 2002 but it seems that it is still not  
operational during writing the report (February 2003); i.e. no information can be found at the webpage of the company 
responsible www. mercatoelettrico.org 
74
 However, a special pricing regime applies for households consuming less than 1,200 kWh – their electricity price is one of 
the lowest compared to consumers in other EU Member states in the relevant consumption brackets (see the Eurostat 
publications mentioned above).  
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oversupply of electricity in the domestic markets of these two countries, is a lack of 
interconnection capacity. 
 
Another obstacle for a competitive market is the structure of the Italian electricity generation 
market. Enel remains the dominant market player on the Italian market even after a divestment 
programme implemented by the Italian Government which reduced the market share from 74% 
in 2000 to about 50% in 2002. However, the strong position of Enel is also based on the fact 
that the Enel group accounted for 59% of electricity available on the Italian market including 
their purchases of the imported electricity. It can be expected that the dominant position of the 
Enel group will change after opening the electricity exchange because the mid-merit plants, 
decisive in the price setting, are almost entirely owned by the Enel group.
75 In addition, Enel is 
the dominant player in the supply sector having had a share of almost 90% in the past which 
slightly decreased during the most recent years. 
The Italian situation shows the significance of trade in electricity. Cross-border trade in 
electricity allows earning arbitrage profits as the result of the price divergence between the low 
price countries, such as France and Switzerland, and Italy as the high price country.  
4.7  The Dutch electricity market 
The Dutch situation is, in terms of market concentration, somewhat different from the 
development in other EU member states considering the rather low market share of three largest 
electricity generators as shown in Table 3.2. However, three of the four largest Dutch 
generators have recently been acquired by foreign multinationals including the German E.ON 
and the Belgian Electrabel which is one of the remaining monopolists in EU member states 
responsible for more than 90% of electricity generated in its domestic market
76.  
The process of liberalisation of the electricity market started in 1999 and is planned to be 
concluded with a completely open and competitive market in 2004. Interesting enough is the 
fact that the market was regulated with regard to price formation until 2000: ‘the so-called 
Protocol, which is an agreement between the four major generators and the distribution 
companies (utilities), stipulating from 1997 till the end of 2000 mandatory sales of electricity at 
fixed prices. Furthermore, the contracting of additional volumes via the spot market and thus by 
imports was limited due to cross-border capacity made available from long-term contracts 
between producers and foreign companies’.
77 During the same time period the Amsterdam 
Power Exchange (APX) was established in 1999. The development of the spot prices at the 
APX (see Table 4.7) shows high volatility during the existence of the power exchange with the 
highest monthly price in January 2000. Since then a slight tendency of lower monthly spot 
 
75 
Ranci P. (2002). 
76 
Energy Research Foundation (ECN) (2002).  
77
 Oostvorn F. van and M. Voogt (2002) p. 7.  
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prices as well as annual averages is perceived. This reduction is accompanied with a steady 
increase in the amount traded at APX corresponding to around 15% of net Dutch electricity 
consumption in 2002.  
 
The Dutch electricity market can not be analysed in isolation from the markets of the 
neighbouring Belgium and Germany. The Netherlands is a net importer receiving the biggest 
share from Germany, while the trade with Belgium is almost balanced. However, the 
interconnector capacity, quite high in this region, particularly when compared to the situation at 
the fringes of the EU, is still not adequate meaning that the ‘demand significantly exceeding 
available import capacity in the last two years’.
78 One of the reasons is the price difference 
between the markets. Another important factor not impeding the creation of a real internal 
market is to guarantee access rights to the interconnection capacity in a transparent and non-
discriminatory manner. However, the rules and regulations adopted by EU member states are a 
long away from conditions which would correspond to them.
79 
Table 4.7  Spot market price at the APX - Netherlands (EUR/MWh) 
Year  Jan  Feb  March  April  May  June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Annual 
average 
                           
1999          18.1  18.8  21.5  21.7  23.9  24.1  25.4  28.0  22.7 
2000  109.7  52.0  34.4  38.4  57.1  35.0  32.7  58.5  36.0  37.0  40.7  48.0  43.1 
2001  33.3  27.0  27.2  25.5  28.7  32.2  50.0  31.3  34.8  26.5  34.7  49.4  33.6 
2002  29.0  22.4  20.0  22.0  20.6  33.8  24.1  40.3  41.0  44.1  35.3  27.8  30.1 
                   
Source: www.apx.nl                    
 
4.8  Conclusion 
This overview describing the electricity market in some EU member states is far from 
exhaustive. It clearly reveals the different developments and current status of these markets and 
consecutively the obstacles faced by European politicians aiming to create a Community-wide 
and competitive electricity market. The list of such barriers stretches from the low 
interconnection capacity between EU member states, to the different speed in opening the 
domestic markets, to diversity in the electricity generation mix, to various levels of 
concentration, and to national regulatory frameworks which are still in place in some of the 
member states. Nevertheless, progress has been made to eliminate or, at least, to reduce the 
effects of these obstacles with regard to creating competitive electricity markets in the EU. 
Examples include the numerous recently established electricity exchanges leading to transparent 
 
78 
Energy Research Foundation (ECN) (2002) p. 80. 
79 
See for an overview of the allocation procedures currently in place: Morrison M.B. (2002) and in addition the discussion at 
the European Electricity Regulatory Forum (Florence Regulatory Process) – see the website of DG TREN for further 
information: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/elec_single_market/florence/index_en.html.  
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pricing and liquid markets of the commodity electricity, the rules and regulations laid down in 
the Electricity Directive itself and further policy initiatives launched by the European 
Commission.  
The Italian regulator for electricity and gas
80 expressed a slight criticism backing our analysis 
regarding the approach chosen for establishing a common-wide competitive electricity market: 
 
When the liberalisation process was launched in Europe great attention was paid to the 
demand side: liberalisation is measured by the degree of market opening, defined as the 
percentage of total consumption accounted for by customers who are free to choose their 
suppliers. The supply side has been somewhat neglected thus far, in the belief that the transition 
from fifteen national markets to one single, larger European market would be sufficient in itself 
to eliminate market power. This is not the case. The move towards a competitive European 
market has come up against two obstacles. 
The first is the headlong process of industrial concentration, which is creating companies 
capable of exercising power over significant portions of the European market, thanks not least 
to their vertical integration, which has barely affected by the separations imposed on them. A 
European electricity oligopoly, made up of five principal companies; these include Enel, which 
has less of a presence outside its won national territory than the others. ….  
The other obstacle is the continuing existence of physical, legislative and commercial barriers 
to free circulation on the European networks.  
 
The political decision makers are undoubtedly facing a huge task to overcome difficulties and to 
remove these obstacles so that the necessary conditions for establishing competition are 
guaranteed. 
 
80 Ranci P. (2002) p. 8.  
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5  The Natural Gas Market 
5.1  Similarities between the gas and electricity market – is a transfer of 
results possible? 
Developments in creating a single European market for electricity are slow but some progress 
can be observed. Probably the main question remaining unanswered thus far is when would this, 
European-wide market, be achieved. Closely connected question is whether the competition of 
the electricity market can, at all, be achieved in the same way as on markets of other 
commodities and services. The same question is raised within the strategy for economic reform 
of the European Council adopted at the Lisbon European Council in the spring of 2000. The 
rationale behind the Gas Directive is almost a complete reflection of the objectives laid down in 
the Electricity Directive. Therefore, it is quite straightforward to ask whether the findings of our 
analysis identifying these obstacles, hindering the creation of a Community-wide electricity 
market, are the same in the case of the development of the gas market. The following chapter 
will try to answer this question. 
The process of liberalising these two markets reveals differences between the two commodities 
– electricity and gas. The main difference between the commodities is the fact that gas is 
storable, while the ability to store electricity is very limited. The transport infrastructure for gas 
between EU member states is already established what differs from the trade volume in 
electricity. Nevertheless, capacity constraints remain one of the barriers of trading gas between 
EU member states. Furthermore, the prospect of physical capacity constraints is still grimmer 
considering the expected increase in the demand for gas by around 40% in the EU member 
states and doubling of the gas consumption in the candidate countries by 2020. 
 
A further obstacle for the creation of a competitive market is associated with the issue of cross-
border trade, namely the question of tarification. The same result can be found both for the 
electricity and the gas market. The current tarification of cross-border trade and capacity 
allocation mechanisms are hampering the development of a single European market for gas 
because of non-cost reflective tariffs and capacity constraints
81. This issue is also mentioned by 
Stern (2002) discussing that network capacity has an increasing importance for the development 
of gas prices. Stern (2002) adds that information relating to network capacity is still not in 
public domain. 
 
Many of these findings were already commented by the European Commission in the first 
benchmarking report: ‘Different tariff structures in member states and in particular the 
cumulative application of distance related tariffs mean that it is unlikely that cost reflective 
 
81 
See for example European Commission (2002a). A comparison of the network tariffs can be found in this publication.  
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network access is available across borders’.
82 Proper functioning co-ordination schemes 
implemented between EU member states could reduce the cross-border transmission tariffs
83. 
The significance of networks tariffs in the formation of end-user price, as found in the 
electricity market, can also be transferred to the gas market
84: The share of transmission and 
distribution costs both for electricity and gas is not negligible in the total price. 
 
Another important issue in the context of competition is a lack of transparency. Full information 
is generally perceived as one of the main preconditions for competition. This precondition is 
currently not guaranteed either on the gas or on the electricity market.  
Another potential obstacle in liberalisation of the gas market into a competition-orientated one 
is the high degree of concentration in the gas supply industry. The same phenomenon observed 
in the electricity market, regarding a further increase in market concentration is present in the 
gas market (see Table V.1). The most recent example was the acquisition of Ruhrgas by E.ON 
in Germany. This acquisition is not only significant for the retail market but also on the import 
level resulting that E.ON has the dominant position on different levels of the gas supply chain 
(import, wholesale and retail). Vertical integration (the link between producer, importers and 
retailer) can reduce some economical and financial risks as the supply of gas can be guaranteed 
to the end markets. However, it can also impede the occurrence of competition because of 
limiting access of new players on the market as well as in the form of strategic pricing 
behaviour.  
Table 5.1  Main European gas players in 2000 
Top ten European suppliers   Total amount  Share of the European market  
                                                        unit: Bcm)                                             (in %)                 
     
Gasunie (NL)  73.0  17 
SNAM (Italy)  63.3  15 
Centrica (UK)  59.0  14 
Ruhrgas (Germany)  51.4  12 
Gaz de France (France)  43.6  10 
Distrigaz (Belgium)  18.4  4 
Gas Natural (Spain)  16.9  4 
BEB (Germany)  16.1  4 
VNG (Germany)  14.1  3 
Wingas (Germany)  10.5  2 
Top ten total  366.3  87 
Europe total  421.9   
 




European Commission (2001a) p. 107. 
83
 See for example: Energy Research Foundation (2001) p.38; and the webpage of the Madrid Regulatory Process 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/gas_single_market/madrid.html.  
84 
see for example the indicative structure for the end-user price for gas in Energy Research Foundation (2001).  
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Compared to the evolution on the electricity market, the analysis so far shows that similar 
features are hampering the development of competition on the gas market. Main findings can 
easily be transferred, while one of the main obstacles for the development of competitive 
markets is related to the high and still increasing degree of concentration on both energy 
markets. Progress has been made, although the development of the gas market is slower and 
factors hampering the creation of the competitive internal energy market have not been cleared 
away. This development can have far-reaching consequences reaching from allowing strategic 
pricing behaviour of the incumbents to negatively affecting the entry of new market players.  
These features will undoubtedly have an effect on the price forming processes of both 
commodities, particularly for the end user. However, the price formation of gas follows a 
commodity-specific characteristic not in accordance with the concept of a price formation under 
competitive condition.  
5.2  Contracts and price formation on the gas market  
5.2.1  The price development in several EU member states 
Before the special features of the price formation of gas and the historical background are 
studied, the development of the gas prices in some EU member states are briefly shown. A 
distinction is made between the development of retail prices before taxes (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) 
shown for the period from 1995 to 2002 and distinguished between two different consumer 
categories and end-user prices (including all taxes) for the period from 1999 to 2002 (Figures 
5.3 and 5.4). 
Figure 5.1  Gas retail prices before tax (nominal prices EUR/GJ) – Eurostat category I4-1 – Consumption of 
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Figure 5.2  Gas retail prices before tax (nominal prices EUR/GJ) – Eurostat category D2 – Consumption of 16 
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Source: European Commission (2002a) and Eurostat 
 
Figure 5.3  Gas end-user prices including all taxes (nominal prices EUR/GJ) – Eurostat category I4-1 – 
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Source: Eurostat. 
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Development of the gas retail prices is different compared to the retail prices for electricity 
considering that there is a clear trend of increased prices discernible between 1999 and 2001. 
This trend comes along with the transposition of the Gas Directive into national law. However, 
this development must be uncoupled from this event because it depends on the formula on 
which the setting of the gas price is based. 
Figure 5.4  Gas end-user prices including all taxes (nominal prices EUR/GJ) – Eurostat category D2 – 















France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden UK  
Source: Eurostat 
 
The graphs in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 reveal that the nominal prices for the end user shown in both 
these graphs have been higher in July 2002 than at the beginning of 2000, the year of 
implementation of the Gas Directive in EU member states. The only exception was Netherlands 
where the household end-user price was 9% lower.  
Worthwhile commenting is the fact that the range of gas prices is smaller compared to that of 
electricity, meaning that the process of converging the gas prices is already underway. This 
point is of some relevance as it was one of the reasons for launching the Gas Directive. 
5.2.2  The price formation on the gas market 
An interesting feature of the natural gas market is the price formation. The majority of gas 
contracts and the determination of gas prices are still based on the, so called, ‘market-value’ 
principle in EU member states. The same is regularly referred to oil-price linkage or oil 
indexation of gas prices, and has first been introduced in the Netherlands after the introduction 
of the Groningen gas fields in 1959. This approach established the pricing structure of gas  
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contracts: ‘the price for gas to be sold to the various types of consumers was linked to the price 
of alternative fuels most likely to be substituted, viz. to gas oil for small-scale users and to fuel 
oil for large-scale users’.
85 This pricing policy was suggested by Exxon, one of the concession 
holders for extracting gas from the Groningen field. Such a policy allowed, both the concession 
holders and the Dutch state, to generate higher revenues compared to the situation in which the 
price would have been related to the actual – quite low – production costs. The specific 
characteristics of this pricing principle lies in the fact that consumers do not pay more for gas 
than for alternative energy fuel products, but also not less. Another characteristic of the gas 
market is the role the ‘long-term take-or-pay contracts’ are playing. This form of contract is 
seen as a central factor for the build-up and development of the European gas market and a 
decisive factor for the development of gas deposits outside of the EU including the construction 
of required transport infrastructure.  
The price formation and contractual agreements are regularly being seen as features not directly 
in accordance with the conditions of establishing an internal energy market leading to 
competition between market players on the different levels of the supply chain. These 
characteristics are essential when the future development of this market is analysed. Main 
aspects are therefore to present the current situation and to assess the possibility of replacing 
long-term contract with short-or medium-term contracts, and assess whether the oil-price 
linkage will be maintained or whether gas-to-gas competition will be the prevailing factor for 
determining the gas price in the future.  
5.2.3  The historical background  
The consumption of natural gas rapidly increased in many EU member states during the last 
forty years; the share of natural gas of total EU primary energy supply grew from around 2% in 
1960 to 16% in 1985 and to approximately 24% in 2000. Several studies forecast a further 
increase as a result of the growing number of household customers and of further investment in 
gas-fired electricity generation plants, so that a share of around 30% of primary energy supply 
seems quite realistic in the not too distant future. The situation concerning gas imports is more 
favourable compared to oil – the EU import dependency for oil is around 70% in 2000 and will 
increase to around 90% in 2030 compared to around 40% for gas in 2000 and around 70% in 
2030
86. It has to be noted that these figures are mainly based on estimates regarding future 
energy demand for the current formation of the EU; i.e. the 15 member states. This will have to 
be revised in the context of the EU enlargement process because it is generally expected that the 




85 Correlje A.F., P.R. Odell (2000) p. 19. 
86 See for a discussion of future energy demand: European Commission (1999a), European Commission (1999b), 
European Commission (2001d) and International Energy Agency (IEA) (2001).  
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The small number of supply countries in combination with the increasing import dependency 
resulting from the raising demand within the EU and dwindling own production is associated 
with some risks. The EU is facing the physical risks of exhausting its own energy sources as it 
already is the case in the UK which will, in the coming years, change the position from a net 
exporter of gas into a net importer. Additionally, when analysing gas market, it is important to 
take into consideration economic risks. These economic risks are stemming from the volatility 
of oil prices that will immediately affect the gas price via the oil-price linkage. Furthermore, 
some form of risks in the form of political instabilities in the major producer countries cannot 
be excluded. As discussed above, since the demand for natural gas for electricity generation is 
projected to increase substantially in the coming year, the risks of gas supply disruption would 
directly affect electricity generation.  
 
The current situation regarding the price formation on the gas market and contractual 
agreements does not necessarily correspond with the concept of a competitive and liberalised 
market, which is on the forefront of EU energy policy. Energy market liberalisation would 
rather mean that the gas price would be determined via competitive forces and the demand and 
supply position. Such a price determining process would require the break-up of the oil-price 
linkage, meaning a decoupling of the gas price from the oil price. Additionally, the systems of 
long-term contracts between gas producer and importers/suppliers which, per se, are not 
hampering the development of a competitive gas market, ought to be reviewed. The strict 
conditions along these contractual agreements are expected to soften, as is already the case with 
Norwegian imports into EU member states. 
 
The oil-price indexation has to be seen as a simple method for gas companies, which are often 
also involved in the oil business, to break into the energy market and increase its market share 
by ensuring that gas is always competitive with competing fuel. The price link was particularly 
advantageous for those integrated oil and gas companies aiming to extend their business by 
developing gas deposits and by financing the investment of the necessary production and gas 
transmission infrastructure. This is of particular interest for companies investing in deposits in 
countries, such as Russia and Algeria, which do not have good credit facilities with 
international financial institutions. ‘Indexing gas prices to oil product prices have proved a 




Long-term take-or-pay contracts are, to some degree, advantageous both for producer and for 
consumer countries. For the latter, they provide some form of stability, although the widespread 
view is that they are more valuable for producer countries. Two of the main gas exporting 
countries, Russia and Algeria, can be described as countries in transition. It is expected that 
 
87
 Eurogas (2001) p. 2.  
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future demand would partly be satisfied with imports from even less developed countries, such 
as countries around the Caspian Sea. They all have in common quite a poor credit ranking and 
limited access to the financial markets, because of associated political and economical risks and 
instability of the political system. 
However, investments for developing new gas fields and the necessary transport infrastructure 
are very expensive and long-term contracts can provide the necessary security so that gas 
producers can get access to the credit market.
88  
5.2.4  The current situation  
Based on the current situation regarding the contractual agreements, as shown in Table 5.2, it 
can be assumed that long-term contracts will continue to play the major role in the supply of gas 
into the European Union for some time. 
The figures presented in this table reveal that with the exception of the UK and the Netherlands, 
the incumbents have secured their gas supply under long-term contracts. The situation in the 
UK differs from the rest of the EU because the liberalisation process started, already in the early 
1990s, as compared to the situation in other EU member states. Additionally, the UK and the 
Netherlands are net-exporters of gas with the security of supply aspect playing a minor role 
there.  
Table 5.2  Sum of annual contract volumes under currently running long-term contracts 
 









Share of long-term 
import contracts 
 
         
Austria   7.3  6.8  1.8  93% 
Belgium   15.9  17.8  0.0  100% 
Denmark   4.6  Exporter  8.1  Exporter 
Finland   4.1  3.4  0.0 
All under contract with 
Gazprom 
France   42.4  43.7  1.7  100% 
Germany   83.3  75.9  18.7  91% 
Greece   2.0  5.5  0.0  100% 
Italy   68.8  55.7  15.9  81% 
The Netherlands  40.9  8.2  61.4  20% 
Portugal   2.4  2.5  0.0  100% 
Spain   18.1  20.3  0.2  100% 
Sweden   1.0  1.1  0.0  100% 
United Kingdom  97.2  1.6  110.1  2% 
 
Source:European Gas Regulatory Forum (2002b) 
 
The growing importance of new, short- or medium-run, contractual agreements is also 
questioned in a discussion document of the 5
th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum 
 
88 
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in 2002: ‘In the future, clearly long-term contracts will also be signed with new market entrants 
and provide for competition across borders. However, in the short- to medium term this is 
unlikely to amount to much real competition’.
89 
 
Based on the experiences gained during the market liberalisation process in the UK, Stern 
(2002) comes to a similar conclusion: ‘The reality appears to be that liberalized markets, despite 
their emphasis on short-term trading, do not signal to demise of long-term contracts. Even 
where markets have been completely liberalised for several years (such as in Britain), around 
70% of gas supplies are still sold on long-term contracts. Neither market liberalisation nor the 
EU Gas Directives preclude the conclusion of new long-term take-or-pay contracts’.
90 Slight 
deviations from the usual experience with this type of contract are already happening as Stern 
reports:
91 
·   ‘Contract length is shortening, such that henceforth ‘long-term’ will be more likely to mean 8-
15 years, rather than 15-25 years. 
·  Take-or-pay obligations – traditionally 80-90% of the annual contract quantity - may be 
reduced, perhaps to 50-60%; 
·  Oil-linked pricing and indexation is changing in favour of floating indexation to a product with 
immediate relevance to the customer, e.g. a gas or electricity spot or future price in a relevant 
location. Such indexation guarantees the buyer that prices will remain competitive with other 
gas supplies. The emergence of a spot market assures buyers that they will be able to on-sell 
volumes surplus to their requirements, rendering take-or-pay obligations much less onerous’. 
The importance of maintaining long-term contractual agreements are revealed as measures to 
ensure stability in security of supply and to uphold a risk-sharing approach between producer 
and consumers countries. However, a liberalised market certainly requires short-term contracts 
providing new market players with the necessary access to supply volumes and establishing 
transparent pricing mechanisms, i.e. gas-to-gas competition.  
 
The process of developing short-term trading markets for gas does not depend solely on spot 
markets. Though it involves removal of anti-competitive conditions from long-term contractual 
agreements. These anti-competitive conditions are under investigation by the EC and the first 
steps for their removal have been agreed. For example, the Norwegian gas sales organisation 
(GFU) has given up its monopoly of being solely responsible for arranging contracts and 
supervising all Norwegian natural gas exports. Other anti-competitive clauses, which are 
regularly part of Russian and Algerian contracts, concern the ban of resale of gas to other 
market players within the EU.  
 
89
 European Gas Regulatory Forum (2002b). 
90
 Stern J. (2002) p. 9. 
91 
Stern J. (2002) p. 9. 
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5.3  The emergence of gas-to-gas competition 
5.3.1  The UK gas market 
The liberalisation of the UK gas market started during the 1980s and was part of a wider 
scheme of privatisation. The initial process started with the privatisation of British Gas (BG) 
which has not changed much since all gas produced on the UK shelf was still contracted out to 
BG. Several gas release schemes were initiated by the regulator and BG was in 1996 divided 
into two companies: Centrica - the gas production, sales and supply company, and BG PLC - 
the transportation and storage company which includes Transco - the part of the company 
responsible for the gas infrastructure. Finally in 1998, the UK gas market was open so that all 
consumers could choose their gas suppliers.
92 With the opening of the gas market de-linkage of 
gas prices from the oil indexed price widely employed in long- term contracts have partly 
emerged as result of the existence of the gas-to-gas competition.  
The UK gas market is currently described as ‘the most competitive in the world. All gas 
consumers in Great Britain are able to choose their gas suppliers from a large number of 
competing companies. All parts of the gas chain are competitive with a large number of gas 
producers operating offshore’
93. However, slightly contradicting the findings of Stern (2002) 
mentioned above, this report further states that around 85% of gas production is sold under 
long-term contracts and with only around 15% sold via the wholesale spot market in the UK. 
The introduction of competition has seen a fall of gas prices from 1995, which can be attributed 
to the beginning of the gas-to-gas competition during a period of relatively stable oil prices.  
As discussed above, a small share of gas is traded either on the spot gas market in the form of 
over-the-counter (OTC) wholesale spot market (mainly based on standardised agreements made 
either bilaterally or via a broker) or on the on-the-day commodity market (OCM) or the futures 
gas market. The volume of OCM is smaller compared to OTC, while an independent market 
operator operates the trade.  
 
The most recent development of the gas price is discussed by ILEX as follows: ‘In recent years, 
gas prices in the UK have generally been determined by the forces of gas supply and demand 
for the various market segments within the UK. Competition among gas suppliers has 
determined the gas price with end users able to choose freely to obtain the lowest price. Spot 
market deals have emerged since 1995, and the spot price has been used as an indexation 
component for some new longer-term gas deals’
94. It is certainly not exacerbated to say that the 




Further changes in this economic sector happened during the last years – the last merger happened in the first half of 
2002 when National Grid (monopoly owner of the electricity transmission network) merged with Lattice which was the 
successor of BG PLC/Transco as the monopoly owner of the transmission network.  
93
 ILEX (2001) p. ii. 
94
 ILEX (2001) p. 11.  
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In the meantime, the wholesale gas prices in the UK have risen dramatically through 2000. 
Apart from the impact of the weather and seasonal influences, this change has been attributed to 
the UK-Continent Interconnector. The interconnector was opened in 1998 and facilitates trade 
between the UK and continental Europe. This process is of interest because it linked two 
different price formation schemes. In 1998, the UK gas market could have been described as a 
competitive market allowing each consumer to choose the supplier, and with a free access to the 
transportation system leading to gas prices, partly determined by the forces of supply and 
demand. The prevailing scheme in continental Europe for determining gas prices is based on the 
oil-price linkage. The opening of the interconnector provided some sort of arbitrage opportunity 
by supplying gas to the higher priced EU market. This happened in 2000 when the gas price in 
Europe increased following the steep rise in the oil price. The result was the massive increase in 
the wholesale gas price in the UK. The European Commission analysed this development and, 
as main reasons identified a different structure of the UK compared to Continental gas markets 
and, above all, the differences in the process of market opening.  
5.3.2  The US gas market 
High European gas prices have regularly been seen as a competitive disadvantage for the 
European industry when compared with the situation in other industrial nations, especially in 
the USA. The lower gas prices have often been attributed to the open and competitive gas 
market in the USA. The intention of the gas market liberalisation is, among others, to establish 
a level playing field between consumers and suppliers based on examples such as the US.  
An analysis of the US gas market shows big differences compared to that of the EU. First of all, 
the US gas market can be characterised as almost self-sufficient, importing only around 16% 
compared to around 57% of total gas consumption in Europe in 1999. Another important 
difference is the geographical distance of these imports. The origin for US imports is North 
America implicating quite short distances, compared to the situation in Europe where longer 
distances have to be covered and requiring further huge investments to extend the pipeline 
network in the future. Another decisive reason for having gas-to-gas competition in the US is 
the big number of producers; i.e. around 5000 producers is located almost evenly across the 
whole country. Additional differences are more difficult geological conditions of gas fields in 
Europe compared to the USA, and the fast development of new gas fields in the USA. ‘New gas 
quantities can be delivered to North America’s consumers in 1 or 2 years, to the UK end users 
in 2 or 3 years. In continental Europe it usually takes not less than 5 to 7 years’.
95 The longer 
period of developing new gas fields is also associated with higher developing costs. 
 
95 
Komarov Y.A. (2000) p. 3.  
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5.3.3  Conclusion 
Several reasons can be identified as being responsible that the oil-price linkage will remain the 
basic mechanism for the formation of gas prices within Continental Europe for the time being. 
Most likely, the experiences gained in the US and the UK so far cannot be easily transferred 
because both countries are gas producers, meaning that their import dependency is rather low 
and the market concentration is too low. It seems that the policy interventions by the UK 
Government in the 1980s and 1990s have been successful in the context of breaking up almost 
monopolistic market structure in both the electricity and the gas sector at that time and 
establishing markets without dominant players. However, some of the biggest electricity and 
gas companies of the Continent started to acquire UK power companies, for example in the first 
half of 2002, RWE acquired Innogy (the second biggest company in terms of installed capacity 
in 2001) and EdF (Electricity de France) the smaller electricity company Seeboard
96. 
Additionally, E.ON took over PowerGen, the third largest electricity generator in the UK. These 
takeovers do not have great consequences regarding the degree of UK market concentration. 
Nevertheless, they are part of the above mentioned regionalisation / Europaisation. Such 
developments, identified as factors hindering the development of a competitive electricity 
market, are also valid for the gas market.
97  
The possibility of gas-to-gas competition will be speeded up with the opening of the hubs 
(standardised exchanges) where excessive supply of gas will be traded on spot markets. Besides 
the National Balancing Point hub (NBP) in the UK and the Zeebrugge hub, two hubs have 
recently been opened: one at the German-Dutch border (Bunde-Oude) and another at 
Baumgarten in Austria. The low number of such trading places can be led back to the existence 
of the long-term contracts and their conditions (as discussed above) not providing an excess 
supply of gas which could actually be sold at these hubs; i.e. the liquidity is very limited
98. The 
existence of such hubs is of great significance for the future development of the gas market 
because they increase the transparency of the wholesale market.  
 
The recent experiences with respect to the development of the UK vs. Continental Europe gas 
prices shows some form of congruence. It seems that the UK gas prices are indirectly linked to 
oil via the Bacton–Zeebrugge gas interconnector. Prior to the opening of the interconnector, EU 
gas prices were high, due to the price linkage with oil, while UK gas prices were substantially 
lower due to downward price pressure of gas on gas competition. After opening of the 
interconnector in 1998, the UK suppliers had the opportunity to export cheap gas into the EU 
and make arbitrage profit.  
 
96 Financial Times, Energy Utilities go on $55bn takeover spree, Monday August 19, 2002. 
97 See for a discussion: European Commission (2001g). 
98 European Commission (2002a) p. 20.  
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It can be expected that de-linkage of gas prices from oil indexation in Europe will happen as a 
gradual process of transition. This would require the establishment of further spot markets / 
hubs as well as increased surplus gas volumes. This will enable suppliers to trade oil-indexed 
contracts and achieve some arbitrage profits between the traded volumes and their oil-indexed 
quantities. The opinion of the European Commission regarding the future of oil-price linkage is: 
 
While this index-linking was presented at the time that natural gas was making a breakthrough 
on the markets as a means of gradually introducing this product, this mechanism now no longer 
has any economic justification and should ultimately be replaced by a price based on supply 
and demand for gas. This cannot happen until a genuinely integrated internal gas market is 
established which is not restricted to the liberalisation of national markets.
99 
 
This statement spells out some of the current problems with regard to establishing competition. 
The question of safeguarding security of natural gas supply has also to be seen in the context of 
opening up the gas market. However, there is a widespread agreement between all market 
players that the demand for natural gas will increase quite dramatically over the coming years. 
This will imply that the EU’s import dependency on natural gas will grow during this period. 
Risks associated with a growing import dependency are addressed by the most recent EC 
policies proposing new measures ensuring the flexibility and security of supplies of natural 
gas.
100 Furthermore, this will require huge new infrastructure investments. According to a study 
commissioned by the European Commission and carried out by the Observatoire Mediterraneen 
de l'Energie, investments of more than USD 200 billion are necessary over the next 20 years to 
bring additional gas to Europe to meet this increasing demand.
101 Some financial support will 
probably be provided by the European Commission as well as national governments. However, 
the majority of these funds have to be borne by gas companies and there is some common 
understanding that long-term contracts are a valuable and necessary tool for securing the 
required financial means by reducing the financial risks for the producer because of securing 
long-term supply channels. These investment needs will probably have some consequences for 
the evolution of the gas price in the medium- to long-term: ’Some experts are predicting rises in 
the price of natural gas of close to 20% by 2010’
102. Additionally, this development can further 
hamper the development of the internal gas market because long-term contracts are not 
necessarily seen as beneficial for the creation of spot markets through the completion of a 
Community-wide gas market.  
 
99 European Commission (2001d) p. 41. 
100 
See for example: European Commission (2002e). 
101
 Observatoire Mediterraneen de l’Energie (OME) (2001). 
102
 European Commission (2001d) p. 41.  
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5.4  Conclusion 
Transposition of the EU Gas Directive started a year later and, hence, the progress in 
accomplishing the underlying objective is lacking compared to the development with regard to 
the Electricity Directive. This outcome is visible when the shaded areas in Table 2.3 are 
compared with Table 2.2. Nevertheless, many of the findings and conclusions drawn from the 
analysis of the development of the electricity market are also applicable. Some of the barriers 
identified above as interferences with the creation of competitive markets are still prevailing on 
the gas market.  
One of the main differences between the electricity market and the gas market is the price 
formation and the long-term contracting approaches. As discussed in some length above, both 
issues are a relic from the past and do not correspond to any form of competitive market 
conditions. The basic principles of this approach are well understood, but they no longer fit into 
the current timeframe. Political decision-makers and, in addition, market players are facing real 
challenges in overcoming this problem considering that the prevailing conditions are benefiting 
many of the market players, although probably not the European citizens.  
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6  The Electricity Market in the Accession Countries 
The European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002 reached an agreement to invite 10 
countries to join the European Union in 2004, which among others, means that these countries 
have to transpose EU Directives into national law. The situation in these countries with respect 
to the implementation of the Electricity Directive is of some interest for this report. The process 
of liberalisation of the internal electricity market does not only affect the current EU member 
states but also the accession countries aiming to integrate these countries into the Community-
wide electricity market in the future. The institutional framework for this policy was laid down 
in the enlargement negotiations requiring the accession countries to transpose EU wide policies 
including the Electricity Directive into national legislation as part of the fulfilling the energy 
chapter of the acquis.  
 
The process of implementing the legal and technical requirements of the Electricity Directive 
has begun in all accession countries. A number of differences as well as similarities between the 
progresses in implementing this Directive in the accession countries compared to EU member 
states can be reported. It can generally be said that the process of opening the electricity market 
is lacking behind the progress made in EU member states. Similar to the development within 
the EU, different levels of implementing the requirements of the Electricity Directive, in 
particular with regard to market opening, has been witnessed between the accession countries. 
All the countries are aiming to achieve the minimum requirement of 33% of eligible customers 
at the date of accession
103. Since the beginning of 2002, the accession countries participating in 
the meetings of the Florence Regulatory Forum discussing issues relevant for the creation of a 
Community-wide market not addressed in the required details in the Electricity Directive, such 
as cross-border trade of electricity.  
 
This brief overview regarding the implementation of the Electricity Directive in the accession 
countries reveals that the policy process is clearly underway. Table 6.1 presents a partial 
overview of the main features of the electricity market in accession countries . The information 
is undoubtedly not complete, although it certainly gives an impression about the situation of 
these markets.  
The generation mix in the accession countries reveals various dependency on energy sources. 
While, thermal convention has the largest share in the generation mix in eight of these 
countries, thermal nuclear in three, one country relies on hydro power. A similar result has been 
found in EU member states. Slightly worrying is the situation in the three countries relying on 
 
103 The Electricity Directive of 1996 required a gradual opening of he electricity market to competition in three steps. In 
2002, 28% of the domestic market should have been open to competition and the share should have be 33% in 2003. As 
discussed above, the timetable for opening up the markets have been revised in the meantime.  
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nuclear power, i.e. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia, where agreements to close down parts of 
their nuclear power capacity owing to the security risks of these installations have been reached 
during the negotiations with the European Union. The situation is in particular perturbing for 
Lithuania having the highest dependency rate of nuclear power. The situation with respect to 
the degree of concentration is very similar. The electricity markets in some of the accession 
countries are still monopolistic structures with the main player a state-owned vertically 
integrated company controlling the whole electricity supply chain. This situation already did or 
will change in the near future because of the legal requirements of the Directive. A new 
phenomenon taking place is that the electricity companies located in EU member states 
acquiring stakes in the former state-owned companies in the accession countries. This process 
obviously corresponds to the findings regarding the most recent developments in EU member  
states. As mentioned above, this evolution can come into conflicts with conditions generally 
identified as prerequisites for guaranteeing competition on electricity markets.  
Table 6.1  Some   characters of the national markets in the accession countries 





- Dominant player is the NEK (national electric utility) with 89% of the total generation capacity; share of  
   independent power producers (IPP) is 11%. 
- NEK operates transmission lines, national dispatch centre and generates electricity. 
- It is planned to start decommissioning parts of the nuclear power capacity in 2003. 







- Isolated power system requiring to have 20-40% electricity reserves 
- Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) – monopolistic, independent and semi-Government institution. EAC is 
  responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. 
- Cross subsidisation of domestic consumers by industrial and commercial users still exist. 
- There is a need to establish an independent regulator for electricity in due course. It is estimated that 
  electricity demand will increase by 5% per annum requiring investments into new generating capacities. 








   
- The generating company CEZ has a dominant position accounting for around 70% of electricity generated 
  in 2001. In the meantime CEZ took over some independent power producer and as CEZ is one of the 
  biggest market player in Europe (see Table IV.4).  
- The opening of the market in 2002 for eligible consumers (above 40 GWh per annum) was accompanied 
  with around 5% price reduction for them, and a price increase of around 10% for households. After this  
  latest price increase cost recovery levels are reached. 
- Czech Republic is connected to the transmission network of EU member states (UCTE – Union for the 
  Coordination of Transmission of Electricity). 










- Estonian electricity generation relies almost completely on oil shale (91% of electricity was generated via oil  
  shale in 2001) and is dominated by the state-owned generator Eesti Energia AS. This company is also 
  responsible for transmission and distribution but with account and management unbundling.  
- Proposals for restructuring and privatisation of the electricity industry have been discussed in the past and 
  foreign investors are represented. 
- The process of opening of the Estonian electricity market started in 1999, one year after a energy sector 
  regulator was established. Price distortions on the electricity market were abolished (no cross 
  subsidisation). 
- Estonia is a net-exporter of electricity (Russia and Latvia). The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and 
  Lithuania, created a Common Baltic Electricity Market in 2000. 
    




- Regulated prices remain in force but only for public-utility consumers. Specific rules apply for export/import 
  of electricity – eligible consumers have the right to import up to 50% of their own consumption. 
- Hungary is linked to the UCTE transmission system. 








- Latvia is net-importer electricity; domestic generation capacity can cover only between 50-70% of total 
  consumption. 
- Latvia made good progress in implementing the internal market although some problems exist regarding 
  the state-owned electric utility, Latvenergo, and unbundling of activities. Latvenergo is the owner of all big  
  power plants supplying 97% of electricity and is the state monopoly for transmission and distribution. The 
  Latvian Parliament decided in 2000 that Latvenergo assets are strategically important and the company 
  was therefore excluded from privatisation. 








- Lithuania is the largest electricity generator in the Baltic countries and a net-exporter. Links to the UCTE 
  are planned (via Poland) but financial support from EU and other investors are required.  
- Nuclear power production accounted for 77% of total electricity generated in 2001 and is comparable to the 
  situation in France. The Lithuanian Parliament agreed to a nuclear closure programme, scheduled to close 
  all nuclear plants until 2009. 
- Further progress was made with respect to the privatisation of the electricity generating and distribution 
  sector; i.e. different companies are responsible for generation, transmission and distribution. 








- The situation in Malta is very different from other countries because of several reasons:  
- The electricity market is closed ; i.e. no connections to any other countries 
- Malta has no indigenous energy sources. One state-owned company completely dominates the electricity 
  generation and distribution market. However, plans to unbundle this company are under way. 
- Malta lacks behind in implementing some of the requirements of the Electricity Directive (target date was 
  December 2002). It is decisive for such an analysis to consider that Malta plans to transpose the Directive 
  with regard to the principle of having a ‘small isolated system’ allowing for some derogation. 









- Poland has substantial indigenous energy sources, hard coal and lignite. Consequently 97% of electricity is 
   generated in coal-fired plants in 2001.  
- Transmission system operator responsible for activities around the transmission grid was established in  
  2001 with 33 companies representing the distribution sector (the majority of them are state-owned). 
- Electricity trade at the Polish Power Exchange started in 2001 via standard transactions or contracts  
  concluded on power exchanges; day ahead exchange-based market, forward exchange-based market 
  (www.polpx.pl) 
- Poland is linked to the UCTE transmission system 








- The portfolio of the generation mix is balanced, a mix of coal, oil and gas, nuclear power and hydropower. 
  In 1997, the restructuring of the electricity market began with the breaking up of the dominant player, a   
  vertically integrated utility. Nowadays, several electricity generators exist as well a grid and market operator. 
  Single distribution company was reorganised by establishing 8 regional distribution companies. Additionally, 
  a regulator, the Electricity & Heat Regulatory Authority (ANRE) was set up in 1999. 
- Price regulations were partly lifted and a minimum price of 50 EUR/MWh were set leading to reduction in 
  consumption and an increase in efficiency.  









- Apart from Bulgaria and Lithuania, Slovakia also agreed to a plan of decommissioning nuclear power plants 
  because of security risks of the installations. A reduction in electricity consumption is reported for the 1990s 
  but since 2000 electricity consumption is increasing again probably exceeding the 1997 level by more than 
  30% in 2010.  
- The dominant player of the electricity market is Slovak Electric, plc. Providing 85% of yearly electricity 
  production. In 2001, this company was separated into three joint stock companies (an independent operator  
  of the power transmission system, a dominant electricity generator and a new independent CHP company) 
  with separate management and accounting 
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- The dominant electricity generator is a joint-stock company but around 96% of the shares are owned by a 
  state institution. The Government plans to sell around 45% of the shares but still keeping the majority of the 
  company as it is adopted in the legislation on privatisation of strategy enterprises.  
 
- The first restructuring activities started in 1990 by separating the distribution activities from generation and 
  transmission activities. At that time, a vertically integrated state-owned utility was the monopolist on all 
  market segments. An independent regulator (Regulatory Office for Network Industries) was established in 
  2001.  
  - Slovakia is linked to the UCTE transmission system. 







- Slovenia will play an important role in the Community-wide electricity market because of the geographical 
  location. The Slovenian grid is connected to Austria, Italy and Croatia and a link to Hungary is planned.  
- The Slovenian electricity sector consists of 4 generation companies, 5 distribution companies and a state- 
  owned transmission system operator (level of unbundling of TSO is 100%). An independent regulatory  
  authority was appointed in 2000 and a market operator established in 2001 is responsible for the running of 
  a day-ahead market for standardised products. 
  
- Electricity prices have increased with a higher rate than the inflation rate since independence. The pricing 
  structure is still distorted because household prices are lower than electricity costs. However, industrial 
  users have to pay higher tariffs as their competitors in EU member states. 
  - Slovenia is linked to the UCTE transmission system. 





- Some significant progress with regard to competitiveness and the internal energy market was made in  
  Turkey in the last years. The electricity market opened in 2002 and the criteria for eligibility are: direct 
  connection to the transmission system and a minimum annual consumption of 9 GWh (i.e. share of open 
  market is around 20%).  
 
- Some regulatory measures concerning imports and exports are still in place; for example, there are some 
  limits for eligible consumers to get supplied from producers outside Turkey.  
 
- The Turkish power market is one of the fastest growing markets in the world, i.e. an annual average of 9%. 
  It is predicted that this growth in electricity consumption will maintain until 2020 with an expected growth 
  rate of 8% per annum. As a result of these forecasts, the Turkish generation capacity probably has to be 
  doubled by 2010.  
 
- The vertically integrated monopolist was broken up into three independent generation, transmission and  
  trading/contracting companies.  
Source: Eurelectric (2002) and European Commission (2002f) 
 
This overview reveals differences as well as similarities between the markets in the accession 
countries and EU member states. It can be recorded that less progress has been made in the 
former with regard to opening the domestic electricity markets to competition. This is not 
surprising considering that the process started earlier in EU member states. However, some 
discrepancies have to be turned up between the accession countries. All countries made steps to 
open their market giving the right to the largest electricity users to choose their own suppliers. 
Countries, such as Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania, have achieved rates of market opening 
almost comparable to the situation in the ‘least opened’ markets of EU member states 
(Denmark, France and Greece – see the opening rates in Table 3.1). The areas identified as 
potential obstacles in terms of the general functioning of the electricity market have been 
addressed in the legislative framework in the accession countries. The rules and regulations 
adopted in the accession countries controlling the access to transmission and distribution 
network are generally in line with the development in EU member states. Progress in 
unbundling of TSOs and DSOs can also be reported. A number of barriers are still existing in  
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the process of achieving a competitive market: end-user prices for electricity are still regulated 
in some accession countries, while a high degree of concentration in the electricity supply 
industry is quite often the rule and not the exemption. Many of these developments, 
demonstrating the changes on electricity markets in accession countries, are similar to the 
situation in EU member states.   
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7  Concluding observations 
7.1  Introduction 
This report has examined the process of creating common and competitive energy markets in 
the European Union. The starting point of this process was the launch of the Directives on 
Electricity and Gas in the late 1990s. This process is part of the strategy for economic reform 
aiming at increasing efficiency of allocation of resources and, hence, enhancing consumer 
welfare. More specifically, increasing competition within the energy markets should lead to a 
reduction of energy prices and to a convergence of prices among EU member states.  
 
As the process of liberalisation has been on the road now for approximately five years, an 
analysis of past developments is a useful input for the policy debate on this issue. What are the 
results of the liberalisation process up to now? Are the policy goals within reach? Which factors 
hamper the creation of competitive European energy market? And finally, which challenges do 
governments face? The focus of the analysis has been the electricity market, albeit the natural 
gas market has also received some attention. 
 
This report has looked into the development of energy prices within several EU countries and 
has answered the question whether prices declined and converged among EU countries. 
Moreover, we have analysed the main obstacles behind the establishment of competitive 
markets at European level. The summary of that analysis is given in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 
offers a concise analysis of policy implications which could be drawn from these findings. 
7.2  Summary of main findings 
7.2.1  Main conclusions 
From the cross-country analysis of past developments within electricity markets, several 
conclusions can be drawn: 
·  Liberalisation of electricity markets raises competition and hence decreases commodity prices, 
provided that institutional settings are organised well. The latter comprises full unbundling of 
production and transmission, sufficient independent suppliers, regulated third-party access to 
the networks, transparency about network tariffs, and well-developed spot markets. This 
conclusion follows from the experiences in the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian 
countries. In these countries, electricity prices have declined after the establishment of adequate 
institutional arrangements. Moreover, the introduction of a spot market in the Netherlands, the 
Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX), has been followed by slightly decreasing electricity prices. 
·  By contrast, in the absence of sound institutional arrangements, liberalisation of electricity 
market will not enhance competition. This conclusion follows from among others experiences  
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in Spain and Italy. Although the process of liberalisation in Spain already started in 1997 and a 
wholesale market has been established, electricity prices are still under government control 
aiming at protecting the incumbents, and domestic consumers. In Italy electricity prices are at 
the highest level within the European Union, which is caused by a high degree of concentration, 
non-existence of a spot market – proposals in this direction have already been approved -, and 
low capacities of the interconnectors. 
·  Differences in national policies regarding the electricity sector do not hamper competition 
provided that those policies are transparent and non-discriminatory. Currently, national policies 
are rather different and not completely transparent. This holds for among others the regulation 
of networks and environmental policies. To date, network charges differ significantly among 
European countries. Low voltage charges are relatively high in Austria, ranging from 50 to 80 
euro per MWh, while the Nordic countries have much lower charges for low voltage transport. 
Medium voltage charges are of course lower, but do also differ among member states. Full 
transparency about tariffs of transport has not been achieved yet, impeding the entry of new 
traders. Moreover, lack of coordination among national methods of allocating the capacities of 
networks hinders access of third-parties. In addition, full transparency about national 
environmental policies does not exist due to the large range of different measures which have 
been implemented at the national level. 
·  Liberalisation of electricity markets could increase the risk of insufficient production in case of 
peak demand. Past experiences, in particular in the Nordic countries, show that market forces 
could fail in realising sufficient capacity. This market failure arises from the fact that private 
benefits of investing in peak capacity are lower than social benefits. The threat of an insecure 
future supply of electricity is increased by the fact that several countries have planned to phase 
out nuclear plants while demand of electricity will probably grow steadily. 
 
7.2.2  Development of prices 
Competition on energy markets affects only some components of the price of energy for end-
users. In general, the end-user price is composed of the commodity price, transport costs, and 
taxes. The commodity price is determined at the wholesale market and depends on the costs of 
generating electricity and scarcity on that market. Costs of transmission and distribution of 
energy, including the mark up charged by energy traders, determine transport costs. The tax 
component, finally, comprises of a value-added tax (VAT) and, in most cases, environmental 
taxes.  
 
The tax component in the end-user price depends to a large extent on national policy decisions. 
It appears that environmental taxes differ strongly among EU countries. In Denmark for 
instance, environmental taxes constituted 34% of households’ electricity price in 2002. On the 
contrary, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom had no environmental taxes at all  
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on the use of electricity by households in that year. In all countries except Italy, environmental 
taxes on the use of electricity by industrial users were low or zero. 
 
End-user prices net of taxes have to be used in order to assess effects of competition between 
suppliers. The commodity price is the main object of competition on the market. Naturally, the 
mark up of traders is also determined by competition in most countries. 
 
The development of end-user prices without taxes within the various European countries shows 
a highly mixed picture. In 8 of the 15 EU member countries, the retail electricity price for 
industrial users has declined since 1995. Industrial users in Germany have got the largest price 
cut (-29%), but also industrial users in Spain, Luxembourg, France, and Finland have faced 
prices declining by more than 15%. End-user prices of industrial users in other countries, 
however, have risen. In particular Italy (+46%) and Denmark (+29%) have shown strong 
increases of the retail price without tax. These huge differences in changes in prices within the 
European Union follow from large differences with respect to the characteristics of national 
electricity markets. Main factors explaining these differences are the composition of production 
by technique and fuels, the degree of competition among producers, and national energy 
policies.  
 
Retail prices for industrial users in Germany were at a high level in 1995. The strong decline of 
the electricity price in this country afterwards resulted from the large excess generation capacity 
at that time, and the increase in efficiency following the restructuring of the industry. For a few 
years now, retail prices of electricity in Germany have been stabilising at a level above that in 
most European countries. Increasing concentration of producers and diminishing excess 
capacity are the factors behind this price development.  
 
The strong increase of the electricity prices in Italy resulted from sharply rising fuel prices at 
the beginning of the current decade. Generation in Italy relies heavily on oil- and gas fired 
power plants: the contribution of these plants to the total Italian production is approximately 
40%. Due to a rather limited interconnection capacity with the markets in the neighbouring 
countries, where prices have been much lower, arbitrage is restricted. Moreover, competition 
within the Italian market is still limited due to the dominant position of the incumbent.  
 
The Netherlands have been confronted with rising electricity prices following the surge of oil 
and gas prices since 1999. Imports have increased strongly, but are restricted by the capacity of 
interconnectors. The introduction of the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) has increased 
competition significantly. Consequently, the volatility of prices has risen. The average monthly 
spot prices have shown a decreasing tendency. However, the small numbers of producers at the 
Dutch market constraints competition.   
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Electricity retail prices in the Scandinavian countries have been quite low compared to other 
European countries. Technical characteristics of the generation of electricity and the 
establishment of the Nordic generation market contributed to this result. Generation in the 
Nordic countries is to a large extent based on techniques as nuclear and hydro, with low 
marginal costs. Moreover, given these techniques, production costs are less vulnerable to 
volatility of fuel prices as they are in for instance Italy and the Netherlands. In addition, the 
establishment of the common Nordic electricity market for Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark has raised competition significantly. Components of this market are a full unbundling 
of production and transmission, regulated third-party access to the networks, and the existence 
of a spot market, called NordPool. Recently, the Nordic market appeared vulnerable to weather 
conditions, however. Due to extremely dry periods, production by hydro generators ceased. 
Consequently, prices at the spot market doubled, in particular in the winter period when demand 
for electricity is high due to the use of electric heating. This event, as did comparable events in 
other countries, initiated increasing attention for effects of market liberalisation on security of 
supply. Section 7.3 elaborates further on this issue. 
 
Recently, electricity retail prices in the United Kingdom have declined strongly. This followed 
from increased competition, accompanied by a growth in (gas fired) generation capacity 
resulting in an oversupply of electricity. Due to the highly fragmented market – with no 
generator having a market share of more than 15% - , individual generators did not have the 
power to raise prices by temporarily mothballing capacity, as has been the case in for instance 
Germany. As a result of this development, several British producers, like the nuclear electricity 
generator British Energy, got in financial problems. Financial intervention by the government 
has saved this former state owned utility from bankruptcy and closure.  
7.2.3  Development of conditions for competition 
 
·  Markets where fierce competition has been established already – the United Kingdom and the 
Scandinavian countries – show well functioning spot markets, unbundling of production and 
transmission, and low degrees of concentration among producers. In addition, it appears that 
peak generation capacity is a necessary condition for getting fierce competition among 
producers.   
·  To date, conditions for more competition have not been fully realised in most member states of 
the European Union. In among others Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, the supply 
side is still dominated by a few players. In the Netherlands, concentration is smaller, albeit the 
three largest generators possess approximately 50% of total generation capacity. Although 
empirical evidence about concentration and commodity prices within the EU-countries does not 
generate unambiguous conclusions, indications about the content of the relation between  
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concentration and prices can be derived. In the United Kingdom, prices declined after the two 
dominating firms had been broken up in smaller companies. On the other hand, a rise in the 
electricity prices followed the merger between the two biggest electricity generators in 
Germany (E.ON and RWE). 
·  Market concentration is a key determinant of price evolution, particularly regarding to 
ownership of the mid-merit (average) plants because these are generally seen as price-shapers. 
Considering the latest developments, it can be expected that European utilities head for even 
larger market shares, enhancing oligopolistic characteristics of regional electricity markets. A 
similar process is underway in accession countries. 
·  Arbitrage of regional price differences is still subject to constraints due to the limited capacities 
of interconnectors, and imperfect coordination of activities of the national Transmission System 
Operators (TSO). In Spain for instance, the capacity of the interconnectors with the grid in other 
countries is no more than approximately 4% of total generation capacity installed in Spain. 
Moreover, a significant part of the existing capacity is not available for trade purposes due to 
existing long-term international contracts. This is illustrated by the interconnection between 
France and Belgium, where less than one fifth of the capacity could be used by traders recently. 
As a consequence, regional suppliers in several countries have opportunities to control the 
market, for instance by strategically mothballing generation capacity. 
·  Albeit competition among producers appears to be an important factor behind end-user prices, 
fiscal and environmental policies also have significant effects on those prices. In several 
European countries, taxes constitute approximately one third of the end-user prices for 
households, making those less sensitive to developments within the wholesale market. In some 
member states (Austria, Germany and Finland), tax increases have offset reductions in the 
commodity price.  
·  Competition on the Natural gas market is also hampered by several of the abovementioned 
factors. In particular, concentration at the supply side and characteristics of the transport grid 
(capacity, access) influence price of natural gas. In addition, the linkage of the price of gas to 
the price of oil, and the existence of long-term contracts hinder competition at the natural gas 
market. 
 
7.3  Policy implications 
7.3.1  Role of governments 
The abovementioned developments challenge governments. Which opportunities do they have 
to overcome the factors hampering competition? Should the policy goal of fully integrated 
European markets be pursued at any price? This section offers a concise analysis of pros and 
cons of several routes within energy policies which could be followed by governments, 
including the European Union. We start with depicting the general framework of analysing the 
role of governments. In the next section, specific measures concerning the electricity markets  
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are discussed. This section ends with sketching the contour of the optimal route of government 
policy regarding the electricity market. 
7.3.2  Market failure and regulatory failure 
Governments may interfere with markets if market failure can be observed. The main source of 
market failure in energy markets is the existence of externalities, being costs or benefits which 
are ignored by markets in the determination of prices. If market failure exists, government 
intervention could improve welfare. However, if regulatory failure exists, intervention by 
governments in the functioning of markets decreases welfare. In general, regulatory failure 
results from insufficient information regarding the market within the government, diverging 
objectives between government and private firms, and non-welfare maximising objectives of 
the government (Helm, et al, 1988).  
 
In the past, the existence of large regulatory failures within the electricity and natural gas 
sectors, which were fully ruled by governments, initiated the process of liberalisation. Looking 
at the current European energy markets, one has to determine to which extent market failure or 
regulatory failure exist.  
 
The cross-country analysis of European electricity markets shows that imperfect competition 
among producers is one of the current shortcomings. This shortcoming follows partly from 
regulatory failures. As the process of liberalisation is still underway, full unbundling of 
production and transmission, sufficient capacity of interconnectors, free access to all networks, 
and well developed spot markets have not yet been established in all countries. When at the end 
of the process, these changes in the energy sector will have been realised, competition among 
producers is enhanced. However, competition is also hampered by market failures. The 
characteristics of the good ‘electricity’ – high demand volatility, limited storability, and 
connection of all producers to one network – offer producers the opportunity to behave 
strategically. Experiences in liberalised regions as the United Kingdom and the Nordic 
countries suggest that possible abuse of market power by generators remains a concern for 
governments. 
 
Recent developments in these markets raise worries about the security of supply. In the Nordic 
market, the generation capacity was fully utilized last winter due to insufficient investments in 
peak production capacity. Profit maximising firms do not invest in capacity which will rarely be 
used. If end-user prices were allowed to reflect scarcity, and hence could surge when all 
capacity is utilised, investments in peak capacity would probably be profitable. From this point 
of view, insufficient investments in normal peak capacity in the current markets results from 
regulatory failure. However, insufficient investment in super-peak generation capacity, which is 
only needed in very occasional cases, can be seen as a market failure. This market failure arises  
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from the fact that the private benefits of investing in super-peak capacity are lower than the 
social benefits of preventing black-outs of the power network. 
 
The analysis of policies within the several member states of the European Union shows that 
governments have implemented a broad range of environmental measures, as environmental 
taxes, financial support schemes for renewable production and standards regarding emissions.  
As far as international environmental problems are concerned, uniform policies in all countries 
contribute to achieving goals regarding environment efficiently. After all, as all firms will face 
equal marginal environmental costs, reduction of pressures on the environment will occur at 
those places where marginal costs are relatively low. However, if countries have different 
preferences regarding environmental issues, the optimal policy at European level could consist 
of different national schemes. Different national preferences regarding environmental issues are 
clearly reflected in the variety within the European Union in national policies on nuclear power 
generation. Some member states have decided to phase out the existing nuclear plants, as 
Germany and Belgium, while another (Finland) has planned to invest in a new plant. 
Differences in national policies could hinder competition at the European level if the measures 
are not transparent or discriminating between national and foreign firms. 
7.3.3  Pros and cons of specific measures regarding the electricity market 
 
In order to overcome the current imperfect competition on the European electricity market, 
governments have several options. In the recently published Acceleration Directive, the 
European Union acknowledges the current shortcomings in terms of insufficient competition, 
and proposes further unbundling of production and transmission, and the compulsory 
introduction of third-party access. In addition, the European Council wants to raise 
interconnection capacities above 10% of installed capacity in each country, and therefore 
increased the EU-budget for financially supporting investments in interconnection. 
 
In general, competition could be enhanced by:  
·  diminishing market shares of dominant players, for instance by an enforced splitting up, as is 
done in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain; 
·  weakening factors which impede entry of new players, for instance by raising feed back fees for  
small-scale generators; 
·  increasing transparency within the market, for instance by the establishment of a spot market; 
·  extending capacities of interconnectors, and improving methods of allocating these capacities; 
·  encouraging transparency of national policies regarding the electricity business; 
·  harmonisation of methods of allocating capacities of transmission. 
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Implementation of each of these options can contribute to the realisation of competitive energy 
markets. On the other hand, implementation of each option induces costs.  
 
Splitting up of large, established firms could lead to the destruction of capital, and would 
involve transaction costs. In addition, splitting up firms carries the risk of quickly diminishing 
mark ups needed for coverage of fixed generation costs.  
 
Encouraging the entry of new players on the markets can be done by supporting small-scale 
generation. Financial support to certain types of small-scale generation, like wind turbines, is 
probably rather expensive given differences in generation costs between those techniques and 
the large-scale generation. 
 
Transaction costs are the main costs of establishing a spot market. Experiences suggest that 
these costs are of a much smaller magnitude than the welfare benefits resulting from increased 
competition. 
 
Increasing capacity of interconnectors demands huge investments, but could have significant 
effect on competition. The profitability of these investments depends on the initial situation 
regarding the capacity, and opportunities to increase the number of players in the domestic 
market. 
 
Encouraging transparency of national policies regarding the electricity sector, among which 
tariffs of network access, improves opportunities for foreign suppliers to enter domestic 
markets. In addition, diminishing network tariffs would encourage third party access and 
probably level the playing field for suppliers. Costs of these measures consist mainly of 
transaction costs. 
 
Finally, harmonisation of activities of the national Transmission System Operators (TSO) 
regarding capacity reservation and congestion management would increase the openness of the 
markets at the European level as it encourages access to the networks in the various member 
states. Costs of harmonisation of transmission comprise mainly transaction costs. 
7.3.4  Conclusion 
 
This report shows that liberalising electricity markets increases competition provided that 
adequate institutional arrangements have been made. This requires, in general terms, combating 
dominant positions of producers by splitting up large established utility companies and 
implementing adequate surveillance on mergers, increasing capacities of interconnectors among  
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the several member states, establishing spot markets at an international level, and encouraging 
transparency of national policies regarding production, transmission and trade. 
 
Although these measures have to be organised at a European level, national governments have 
an important role in the implementing stage. From the cross-country analysis described in this 
report follows that several countries have a long way to go. Others, among the Netherlands, 
have already realised many of the necessary conditions for a European electricity market. 
 
In order to cope with the issue of security of supply, governments could introduce market based 
instruments. One of the options is the establishment of a so-called capacity market beside the 
commodity market. Experiences outside Europe suggest that this instrument could be an 
efficient instrument for realising sufficient peak capacity. This measure could be accompanied 
by policies focussing at the demand side. If governments and societies in general, accept 
electricity prices to surge in reaction on shortages, electricity firms would get incentives to 
invest in peak capacity while consumers would be stimulated to lessen their power 
consumption. 
 
Despite the evidence produced by the experiences up to now, several questions remain to be 
answered. Generally, those questions refer to the specific institutional arrangements needed for 
the realisation of competitive markets, and mutual relations between competition, environment 
and security of supply. In order to contribute to the debate on these issues, CPB organises, in 
close cooperation with the Dutch Energy Council (AER) and the Energy Research Centre of the 
Netherlands (ECN), a research symposium on European electricity markets. This symposium, 
which will take place in The Hague at September 26 this year, aims at offering insight in the 
main future policy issues and challenges for economic research. 
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Annex 
Table A.1         Overview of factors affecting the creation of an internal energy market in several European  
                         countries                   
  Belg   Den   Fin   Fr   Ger   Italy   Neth  Sp   Sw   UK   Nor  
 
Electricity generation (in %)  
Conventional thermal   39.6  88.1  50.8  8.8  62.5  77.7  94.6  50.3  6.1  75.7  0.7 
Thermal nuclear   58.2  0.0  30.6  76.3  30.5  0.0  4.1  28.8  43.9  22.6  0.0 
Others & hydro  2.2  11.9  18.6  14.9  7.0  22.3  1.3  20.9  50.0  1.7  99.3 
                       
Amount of reserve 
generating capacity in %   2  1
a
   1
a
  16  5  9  7  16  1
a
  12  1
a
 
                       
Total net generation 
(TWh in 2001)  79.6  36.0  72.0  511.8  501.5  266.5  89.8  206.3  157.8  358.6  122.0 
Import (TWh)  15.7      4.8  32.8  43.8  21.5  10.2    14.3   
Exports (TWh)   6.7      71.1  37.9  1.5  4.2  4.8    0.1   
Export/Import Balance  -9.0  1.0  -10.0  66.3  5.1  -42.3  -17.3  -5.4  7.3  -14.2  -4.0 
Ratio:   83.6  35.0  82.0  437.0  495.4  305.4  107.1  205.7  150.5    125.0 
Import/total net generation 
Import  capacity/ 
installed capacity  25%  39%  22%  12%  11%  14%  19%  4%  29%  3%   
                       
Pricing approach                       
- via pool system (spot 
market, etc.)   no  yes   yes   no  yes     yes   yes   yes   yes  yes  




pool  no  EEX 
under 
prepa-
ration  APEX  OMEL 
Nord 






Source: Eurelectric www.eurelectric.org, Swedish Energy Agency (2002), European Commission (2002a)  
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Table 7.1  Electricity retail prices (nominal prices EUR/MWh, before taxes ) Eurostat category: Ig - 






























                             
Italy   52  49  52  56  59  58  60  54  53  54  60  69  79  71 
Ireland   51  49  50  52  56  57  53  53  53  53  53  53  53  53 
Belgium   60  61  60  59  58  58  56  57  55  55  55  58  57  59 
Portugal   66  65  62  62  61  60  58  58  53  53  53  53  53  53 
Germany   76  77  72  70  68  66  66  65  63  63  50  52  53  53 
Austria   69  70  69  67  66  65  63  63  60           
Greece   48  50  49  50  49  49  49  47  49  49  48  47  48  50 
EU  53  54  52  54  52  50  50  49  48  47  47  47  47  47 
France   56  56  56  56  55  51  52  50  50  49  49  47  48  48 
UK     62    59  60  50  54  51  59  49  54  54  51  48 
Spain   62  63  64  63  59  58  52  52  53  53  54  54  49  49 
Netherlands   48  48  49  48  48  47  47  48  48  49         
Denmark   40  42  43  43  43  42  47  45  44  43         
Luxembourg   48  49  49  49  49  48  46  46  47  47  45  43  38  38 
Finland   44  40  42    37  36  36  37  35  34  34  34  33  34 
Sweden       33  35  37  35  33  30  28  28  28  30  24  31 
 





































                                   
Italy   110  103  110  116  119  119  119  114  114  115  119  128  87  78  98  155  6% 
Ireland   126  122  123  125  133  135  126  127  126  126  126  126  126  126  127  130  3% 
Belgium   147  149  148  147  147  146  148  149  148  148  143  146  125  128  129  127  -14% 
Portugal   127  127  121  121  121  118  115  115  105  105  104  104  105  105  100  122  -6% 
Germany   180  183  176  171  165  162  163  163  162  158  139  134  133  133  131     
Austria   172  175  174  172  163  160  161  161  162  162  157  126  112  102  96  100  -38% 
Greece   83  86  84  86  85  84  86  82  86  86  84  83  84  87  87  99  15% 
EU  113  113  110  111  108  105  105  104  103  102  99  98  92  92  93  97  -6% 
France   101  101  102  100  100  91  92  89  89  87  87  85  85  85  86  101  13% 
UK   125  118  125  119  114  105  109  105  107  108  107  101  94  93  92     
Spain   118  120  122  120  111  109  100  100  98  98  98  98  98  98  99  86  -12% 
Netherlands   93  94  95  92  92  91  91  92  92  94  78  101  104  106    87  -5% 
Denmark   48  49  52  52  51  51  54  52  53  52  56  55  64  65  69  86  62% 
Luxembourg   144  141  140  140  139  136  136  137  139  137  133  131  119  121  122  67  -52% 
Finland   61  64  66  65  60  59  58  59  56  55  55  54  53  54  56  57  2% 
Sweden       70  72  70  69  69  67  63  59  56  53  40  41  36  56  -11% 
 
Source: European Commission (2002a) and Eurostat 
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% Change Jan 
 99 / Jul 02 
                                   
Italy   151  143  151  159  167  165  168  158  157  158  150  160  157  146  139  142  -10% 
Ireland   73  71  72  77  82  85  80  80  80  80  80  80  80  80  88  125  56% 
Belgium   123  125  124  122  119  119  119  120  118  118  117  117  118  118  114  122  3% 
Portugal   126  126  126  125  128  125  125  125  120  120  119  119  120  120  122  112  -7% 
Germany   130  132  132  129  127  125  126  126  128  129  119  120  122  123  126  111  -13% 
Austria       103  102  98  97  97  97  98  98  95  95  95  95  93  97  -1% 
Greece   65  62  61  63  62  61  63  60  62  62  56  55  57  58  58     
EU  98  99  101  99  99  96  98  96  95  94  93  94  97  95  96    -19% 
France   101  102  102  102  101  95  96  94  95  93  93  91  91  91  92  92  -3% 
UK   113  111  112  112  108  107  105  103  102  101  99  97  96  97  97  98  -4% 
Spain   106  108  109  108  105  103  95  95  93  91  90  90  86  86  86  88  -5% 
Netherlands   85  90  101  99  88  87  87  87  88  82  94  108  98  89  91  84  -5% 
Denmark   61  63  65  64  64  63  67  67  68  68  72  72  78  82  87  86  26% 
Luxembourg   107  109  109  109  107  105  106  106  108  107  106  105  112  114  115  69  -36% 
Finland   70  74  77  76  73  72  71  71  66  65  65  64  64  67  70  70  6% 
Sweden         66  68  67  67  70  65  62  64  65  63  67  70  58  -11% 
 
Source: European Commission (2002a) and Eurostat 
 
Table 7.4  Electricity end-user prices (nominal prices EUR/MWh, including all taxes; VAT and energy 
taxes) Eurostat category: Ig - Consumption of 24,000 MWh/year – industrial users 
  Jan 99  Jul 99  Jan 00  Jul 00  Jan 01  Jul 01  Jan 02  Jul 02 
% Change  
Jan 99 and July 02 
                   
Italy   74  70  79  89  94  96  92  96  30 
Ireland   60  60  60  60  60  60  73  73  22 
Belgium   67  67  67  70  69  71  71  70  4 
Portugal   55  55  55  55  56  56  58  58  5 
Germany   69  82  55  55  62  62  62  62  -10 
Austria   81                 
Greece   53  53  52  51  52  54  54  54  2 
France   59  57  57  55  64  56  57  58  -2 
UK         67  62  68  62  57   
Spain   64  64  65  65  60  60  57  57  -11 
Netherlands   57  57               
Denmark   84  82               
Luxembourg   50  50  47  46  42  42  43  42  -16 
Finland   48  47  46  46  46  47  50  50  4 
Sweden   35  35  35  38  30  39  33  32  -9 
                 
Source: Eurostat                 
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Table 7.5  Eurostat category: Ib - Consumption of 50 MWh/year – industrial users 
  Jan 99  Jul 99  Jan 00  Jul 00  Jan 01  Jul 01  Jan 02  Jul 02 
% Change  
Jan 99 and July 02 
                   
Italy   154  165  159  169  115  110  135  140  -9 
Ireland   142  142  142  142  142  142  143  143  1 
Belgium   180  179  175  179  153  157  158  159  -12 
Portugal   110  110  109  109  111  111  105  105  -5 
Germany   220  246  181  181  188  188  189  189  -14 
Austria   204  204  197  169  150  138       
Greece   93  92  91  89  91  94  94  94  1 
France   109  106  106  103  103  103  105  105  -4 
UK   114    107  135  135  140  123  109  -4 
Spain   119  119  119  119  119  119  120  120  1 
Netherlands   137  137  121      158       
Denmark   94  94  98  97  109  110  115  112  19 
Luxembourg   147  146  142  139  131  133  136  137  -7 
Finland   73  73  72  72  71  72  74  74  1 
Sweden   79  73  70  67  50  51  45  45  -43 
                 
Source: Eurostat                 
 
Table 7.6  Eurostat category: Dc - Consumption of 3.5 MWh/year – household users 
  Jan 99  Jul 99  Jan 00  Jul 00  Jan 01  Jul 01  Jan 02  Jul 02 
% Change  
Jan 99 and Jul 02 
                   
Italy   211  212  201  211  204  197  190  195  -8 
Ireland   89  89  89  89  89  89  99  99  11 
Belgium   145  144  143  143  145  145  139  136  -6 
Portugal   127  126  113  126  126  126  129  129  2 
Germany   159  195  149  149  149  162  162  169  6 
Austria   126  126  123  132  132  133  134  116  -8 
Greece   88  67  61  60  61  63  63  63  -28 
France   122  112  112  117  117  117  119  120  -2 
UK   100  107  113  108  89  110  108  102  2 
Spain   113  112  109  109  105  105  105  105  -7 
Netherlands   124  107  139      159  164  173  40 
Denmark   184  191  180  196  207  211  220  218  18 
Luxembourg   114  114  112  111  124  126  129  130  14 
Finland   89  87  87  87  86  90  94  94  6 
Sweden   96  98  102  104  103  109  113  112  17 
                 
Source: Eurostat                 
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Table 7.7  Gas retail prices (nominal prices EUR/GJ, before taxes) Eurostat category: I4-1: Consumption of 






























                             
Italy   2.9  2.9  3.1  3.4  3.7  3.6  3.5  3.3  2.9  2.8  3.4  4.5  5.6  5.6 
Belgium   3.3  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.4  3.6  3.5  3.2  2.7  2.7  3.6  4.5  5.5  4.9 
Germany   3.8  3.8  3.6  4.0  4.1  4.4  4.1  4.0  3.5  3.1  3.9  5.1  6.5  6.3 
Austria     4.0  4.0  4.0  3.8  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.6    4.4  5.5  5.6 
EU  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.6  3.4  3.5  3.1  2.9  3.0  3.7  4.5  5.5  5.1 
France   2.5  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.7  2.6  2.6  3.5  4.1  5.2  4.4 
UK     3.2    2.3  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.0  2.8  2.9  3.5  4.3 
Spain   2.8  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.5  3.1  3.5  3.0  2.7  2.9  3.9  4.7  5.4  4.6 
Netherlands   2.8  2.9  2.7  3.0  3.0  2.9  3.0  2.7  2.4  2.4  2.8       
Denmark   3.2  3.2  2.9  2.8  3.3  2.9  2.9  2.5  2.1  2.8  3.7  5.0  4.9  4.3 
Luxembourg   3.9  3.8  4.1  4.3  4.9  4.5  4.8  3.7  3.7  3.9  4.8  6.0  6.6  6.9 
Finland   2.4  2.9  2.7  3.2  3.6  2.9  3.2  2.5  2.1  2.6  3.9  4.7  5.4  4.6 
Sweden                           7.3  5.5 
         
Source: European Commission (2002a) and Eurostat         
 






























                             
Italy   8.7  8.1  8.6  9.1  9.1  9.0  8.9  8.9  9.0  9.0  9.7  10.7  12.0  11.3 
Belgium   12.2  12.4  12.2  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.2  12.0  11.8  11.6  12.8  13.7  14.9  14.3 
Germany   11.8  11.6  11.2  10.8  11.5  11.4  11.2  11.1  11.0  10.5  11.2  12.3  13.8  14.3 
Austria       8.6  8.5  8.3  8.2  8.2  8.2  8.3  8.3  8.3  9.9  11.6  11.6 
EU  10.9  10.8  10.7  10.7  10.9  10.8  10.7  10.6  10.0  9.9  10.5  11.2  12.2  12.2 
France   11.3  11.3  11.3  11.2  11.3  11.5  12.0  11.6  11.4  10.8  10.8  11.5  13.0  13.9 
UK   9.9  9.8  9.8  9.7  9.7  9.5  9.5  9.3  9.1  9.0  9.0  9.0  8.8  9.1 
Spain   11.0  11.2  11.8  11.6  11.7  11.6  11.6  11.6  11.3  10.7  11.6  13.0  14.1  13.8 
Netherlands   8.2  8.2  8.1  8.3  9.2  9.3  9.1  8.7  8.4  8.2  8.5  8.9  9.2  9.6 
Denmark                   6.0  6.8  9.0  9.7  11.0  9.1 
Luxembourg   10.1  10.4  10.8  10.9  10.8  10.9  10.7  10.6  10.3  10.2  10.7  11.8  12.6  12.7 
Finland                              
Sweden         10.0  9.9  9.5  9.4  9.3  9.3  9.7  9.8  10.0  11.0  11.8 
Ireland   15.0  14.5  14.6  15.0  16.0  16.1  15.1  15.2  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4 
   
Source: European Commission (2002a) and Eurostat   
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Table 7.9  Gas end-user prices (nominal prices EUR/GJ, including all taxes) Eurostat category: I4-1: 
Consumption of 418.6 TJ/year c.120 GWh – industrial users 
  Jan 99  Jul 99  Jan 00  Jul 00  Jan 01  Jul 01  Jan 02  Jul 02 
% Change Jan 
00 and July 02 
                   
Italy   3.7  3.7  4.4  5.4  6.4  6.5  6.5  5.5  25 
Belgium   3.3  3.3  4.4  5.4  6.7  5.9  5.3  5.2  18 
Germany   5.1  5.1  5.9  7.3  9.3  9.5  8.6  7.5  27 
Austria   5.8  5.7    6.6  8.0  7.3  7.0  7.1   
France   3.3  3.5  4.6  5.3  6.6  5.7  5.0  5.2  13 
UK   3.6    3.4  3.5  4.2  6.1  6.0  4.9  44 
Spain   3.1  3.4  4.5  5.4  6.3  5.3  5.8  4.7  4 
Luxembourg   3.9  4.1  5.1  6.4  7.0  7.3  5.1  5.8  14 
Finland   3.1  3.8  5.3  5.9  6.4  6.2  5.4  6.0  13 
Sweden           10.3  10.2  9.7  6.8   
                 
Source: Eurostat                 
 
Table 7.10  Eurostat category: D2: Consumption of 16 GJ/year c. 4.5MWh – household users 
  jan-99  jul-99  jan-00  jul-00  jan-01  jul-01  jan-02  jul-02 
% Change Jan 
00 and July 02 
                   
Italy   12.1  12.2  12.8  13.8  14.8  13.9  13.9  13.6  6 
Belgium   14.6  14.5  15.9  17.0  18.5  17.7  17.3  17.1  8 
Germany   12.3  12.3  13.3  14.8  17.3  17.3  16.2  16.2  22 
Austria   11.3  11.3  11.3  13.2  15.2  15.2    14.0  24 
France   13.0  12.4  12.4  13.1  14.7  15.8  15.8  15.3  23 
UK   7.7  8.2    9.7  9.4  10.3  10.1  10.1   
Spain   13.1  12.4  13.5  15.1  16.3  16.0  18.3  14.8  10 
Netherlands   10.3    10.4  10.8  8.6  9.0  9.5  9.5  -9 
Denmark   34.4  34.3  40.7  40.6  43.7  44.0       
Luxembourg   10.9  10.8  11.3  12.6  13.4  13.5  12.3  12.3  9 
Sweden   14.9  15.4  15.7  16.1  18.4  19.2  19.8  19.7  25 
Ireland   16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  0 
Portugal   15.8  15.8  15.8    18.5    16.7  15.8  0 
                 
Source: Eurostat                 
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Abstract 
This Document describes the background and the rationale of the European Union for pursuing 
liberalised energy markets, explains why this policy goal is not achieved yet, and discusses 
recent developments and some of the future challenges faced by political decision makers.  
 
Five years after launching the process of electricity liberalisation, dominance of large utilities, 
lack of international transmission capacity, and national energy policies hinder the creation of 
competitive energy markets in Europe. Consequently, the expected downward convergence of 
electricity prices for EU business and EU consumers has only partly been realised.  
 
Established utility companies still have a strong position on some national electricity markets. 
By means of (inter)national mergers, they increase their market shares at the European level. As 
a consequence, the price of electricity remains at a higher level than the costs of generating the 
electricity. In addition, producers lack strong incentives to decrease costs and to develop new 
techniques of generation owing to missing fierce competitive market forces. 
 
The document shows that liberalising electricity markets increases competition provided that 
adequate institutional arrangements have been made. This requires, in general terms, combating 
dominant positions of producers by splitting up large established utility companies and 
implementing adequate surveillance on mergers, increasing capacities of interconnectors among 
the several member states, establishing spot markets at an international level, and encouraging 
transparency of national policies regarding production, transmission and trade. 
 
 